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ABSTRACT
The concept of ambiguity plays an underappreciated and undertheorized role in the judicial review of agency statutory interpretations. Its importance is difficult to exaggerate. Ambiguity often
functions as the determiner of whether an agency’s statutory interpretation will receive deference, as well as whether courts will apply the
stare decisis standard for statutory interpretation cases instead of the
recent principle that agencies can change their interpretations even
in the face of a previous conflicting judicial interpretation. The
prominence of ambiguity has caused many commentators and courts
to proclaim a bright line distinction between interpretive tools that
help evaluate statutory clarity and those that resolve statutory uncertainty. Although linguists would agree that ambiguity is unexceptional in normative legal texts due to its ubiquity, the judiciary,
which has created a highly idiosyncratic definition, is far more selective about declaring language to be ambiguous. The judiciary’s selectivity regarding ambiguity is driven by its conflation of ambiguity
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identification with ambiguity resolution, which allows courts to determine arbitrarily the context for resolving statutory meaning
through the discretionary selection of judicially created, but untested,
interpretive tools.
This Article addresses the concept of ambiguity from a linguistic
perspective and argues that the United States Supreme Court’s Chevron doctrine has fostered an unfortunate emphasis on ambiguity.
Instead of Chevron’s misguided elevation of the explicit ambiguity
determination, judicial review should focus on other considerations.
Such a commitment would mean the end of the bifurcated review
process that distinguishes between ambiguity identification and ambiguity resolution. It would also allow for the consideration of substantive canons of statutory construction equally in agency and nonagency cases. Finally, it would view Chevron’s contribution to statutory interpretation as a softening of the strict stare decisis standard
that would no longer depend on a previous explicit ambiguity
determination.
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INTRODUCTION

Is it possible that a case widely viewed as the most cited and important public law decision in the past quarter century, which has
spawned innumerable law review articles, could be an enigma?1 If so,
the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.2 certainly qualifies.
Despite the unprecedented attention paid to Chevron over the past
twenty-five years, fundamental questions about it remain. To be sure,
scholars have extensively addressed many of these issues. The scholarship, though, has tended to focus on two main categories of issues: (1)
the scope of Chevron, including whether it should apply in certain circumstances;3 and (2) whether Chevron’s division of interpretive authority between courts and agencies is desirable as a normative
matter.4 One of the most significant aspects of Chevron—its elevation
of an explicit ambiguity analysis as the determiner of whether an
agency interpretation will receive deference—has remained undertheorized. Likewise, other problematic ways in which the Chevron doctrine intersects with the concept of ambiguity also have remained
1. See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 140 (4th ed. 2002)
(“Chevron is one of the most important decisions in the history of administrative law. It has
been cited and applied in more cases than any other Supreme Court decision in history.”);
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 824 (2006) (describing Chevron as “one of the most
important rulings in the past quarter century in American public law”).
2. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 838–39 (2001) (examining whether Chevron applies in various situations, including
agency interpretations of their own jurisdiction).
4. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 86–87 (1994) (arguing
that the current application of Chevron does not accord with public policy because it reflects a pluralistic democracy model, rather than a deliberative democracy model).

R
R
R
R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-4\MLR401.txt

794

unknown

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

Seq: 4

25-AUG-10

8:22

[VOL. 69:791

largely ignored in the areas of stare decisis and the application of substantive canons of statutory construction.
It is perhaps not surprising that most of the scholarly focus has
been on Chevron’s allocation of interpretive authority as a matter of
policy or political legitimacy, rather than from a linguistic perspective.
Superficially at least, Chevron’s description of how interpretive authority is to be allocated is linguistically straightforward. The first step
(“Step One”) requires the reviewing court to inquire whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” using “traditional tools of statutory construction.”5 If the reviewing court
determines that “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue,” it should proceed to the second step (“Step Two”),
which requires the court to defer to a reasonable agency interpretation, even if that interpretation is not the one that the reviewing court
would have chosen.6 A court’s search for clarity in Step One thus
stands in contraposition to the finding of ambiguity that triggers Step
Two.7
Under Chevron, the concept of ambiguity is therefore central to
whether an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administers will
receive judicial deference, but the determination of ambiguity by the
judiciary is entirely standardless and discretionary. The definitions of
ambiguity used by courts are themselves vague, ambiguous, and unhelpful.8 More importantly, judges conflate the identification of ambiguity with its resolution.9 Thus, courts label a provision ambiguous
only when the context fails to reveal the correct interpretation, which
makes the identification of permissible contextual evidence crucial.10
Interpretive tools, such as legislative history, canons, dictionaries, leg5. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 843 n.9.
6. Id. at 843 (stating that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous . . . the question . . . is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute”); see also
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)
(“Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction of the statute, even if
the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory
interpretation.”).
7. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 986 (“If the statute is ambiguous . . . we defer at step two to
the agency’s interpretation so long as the construction is ‘a reasonable policy choice for
the agency to make.’” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845)).
8. See infra notes 38–45 and accompanying text (describing the various definitions of
ambiguity used by courts).
9. See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (explaining how courts conflate ambiguity identification with ambiguity resolution).
10. See Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
411, 411 (1996) (stating that “indeterminacy is a function both of the level of uncertainty
concerning any particular claim and of the standard of proof that is needed to establish a
claim”).
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islative purpose, and pragmatic judgments, provide the context that
courts consider when determining whether statutory language is ambiguous.11 If a consensus existed regarding the accuracy of these interpretive tools, the judicial conflation of ambiguity identification and
its resolution would be trivial. This is not the case, however. Modern
statutory interpretation, both inside and outside of the administrative
state, is replete with hermeneutical disputes, which include questions
regarding the accuracy of all of the interpretive tools commonly used
by courts.
The problematic nature of establishing the accuracy of any given
interpretive tool undoubtedly helps to explain why courts do not purport to base their selection of interpretive tools on empirical evidence.12 Instead, the selection of interpretive tools to provide
contextual evidence of ambiguity, the persuasive force to give each
interpretive tool, and the point at which the interpretive tools are
deemed not to signal a correct meaning are, among other related issues, entirely matters of judicial judgment.13 Further, courts arbitrarily designate certain interpretive tools as being applicable to
ambiguity determinations and others as being applicable to only ambiguity resolution, such as the position of some courts, including the
Supreme Court on occasion, that legislative history will only be considered if the statute is first found to be ambiguous.14 Thus, the Chevron
doctrine’s reliance on explicit ambiguity conclusions to determine
whether an agency’s interpretation will receive deference has elevated
the importance of a concept that is subjective, discretionary, typically
addressed through conclusory statements, and, not surprisingly, a
source of considerable disagreement among members of the Court.15
Commentators see the Chevron doctrine as making a sharp distinction between assessments of statutory clarity and the resolution of
11. See infra Part III.D (describing the various interpretive tools that courts apply when
deciding whether a statutory provision is ambiguous).
12. See infra Part II.B.4 (explaining the difficulty of measuring the accuracy of interpretive tools).
13. See infra Part II.B (explaining the various aspects of the ambiguity determination
that are subjective and discretionary).
14. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567 (2005)
(indicating that a court should only consult legislative history after it first determines that
the statute is ambiguous).
15. See Bruce A. Markell, Bankruptcy, Lenity, and the Statutory Interpretation of Cognate Civil
and Criminal Statutes, 69 IND. L.J. 335, 346 (1994) (explaining how “the Court is deeply
divided” regarding how ambiguity should be determined); see also Moskal v. United States,
498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (wondering “‘how much ambiguousness constitutes . . . ambiguity’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 948 (D.C. Cir.
1985))).
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ambiguity through policy choices, but the application of any interpretive tool in Step One is discretionary and is thus, in a sense, a policy
choice because the tool might resolve the hermeneutical inquiry at
Step One and preclude agency discretion. Notwithstanding the general problem of establishing the accuracy of any particular interpretive tool used to provide contextual evidence of statutory meaning,
the application of substantive canons of construction in Step One is
widely thought to raise particular problems of legitimacy. Substantive
canons, also known as “normative canons” among other terms, are
commonly described as policy-based directives about how statutory uncertainty should be resolved.16 These interpretive tools are applicable
in cases involving a wide range of issues, including constitutional concerns, retroactive effects, divestment of judicial review or habeas
corpus jurisdiction, extraterritorial application, negative impact on
Native Americans or immigrants, or various federalism concerns.17 In
addition to their widely perceived association with judicial policy
choices, substantive canons are controversial because they often require courts to choose textually less persuasive interpretations and to
narrow invariably the meaning of the applicable statutory provision.18
The application of a substantive canon in Step One, therefore, has the
effect of precluding judicial deference to an agency interpretation in
favor of a less textually persuasive interpretation.19
The Chevron Court did not provide much guidance regarding
which traditional tools of statutory construction are appropriate in
Step One, and thus left the canons to play an uncertain role in the
review of agency interpretations of statutes.20 Notwithstanding significant scholarly criticism, though, the Supreme Court has on several
occasions applied substantive canons instead of deferring to agency
interpretations.21 Based on the conventional understanding of sub16. See infra notes 106–07 and accompanying text (describing the conventional view
that substantive canons are policy-based).
17. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 880–941 (4th ed. 2007) (listing and exploring
many of the substantive canons).
18. See infra notes 111–20 and accompanying text (describing substantive canons).
19. See Brian G. Slocum, Canons, the Plenary Power Doctrine, and Immigration Law, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 363, 376–77 (2007) (explaining how substantive canons result in courts
choosing “second-best” statutory interpretations).
20. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 742 (2004)
(“Courts have yet to articulate a consistent framework to reconcile substantive canons with
Chevron, leaving the status of the canons murky.”); The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Leading
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 306, 528 (2001) (“Traditional canons of statutory interpretation
have played an unclear role in reviewing agency constructions of statutes in recent years.”).
21. See infra note 109 (citing several cases in which the Court has allowed substantive
cannons to displace Chevron).
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stantive canons, these decisions are troubling considering the Court’s
recent statement that interpreting ambiguous statutes “involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make than
courts.”22 The flaw in the conventional view of substantive canons as
policy-oriented devices used to resolve statutory ambiguity is that the
Court avers that these substantive canons reflect congressional intent.23 Further, it can be plausibly said that the various substantive
canons do not resolve ambiguity, but instead represent useful conventions about language that apply at the outset of the interpretive
process.24
The concept of ambiguity is also crucial to the operation of stare
decisis in the administrative state. In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,25 the Court addressed the tension between the rationale of Chevron, which asserts that agencies may
legitimately change their interpretations of ambiguous statutes, and
the traditional stare decisis rule that judicial interpretations of statutes
in particular are not amenable to be overruled.26 The Court held that
“[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior
court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”27 The Brand X decision has thus created another significant
doctrinal distinction where an explicit ambiguity finding is the determiner. If the original reviewing court decided that the statute was
unambiguous, the traditional heightened stare decisis rule applies. If
instead the original reviewing court decided that the statute was ambiguous, the agency’s subsequent interpretation may receive Chevron
deference.
The Chevron doctrine is an enigma because the concept of ambiguity obscures its true character. Chevron has been described as a
moderate interpretive doctrine,28 but this description is most accurately viewed as an abstraction. On a very general level, by providing
22. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980
(2005).
23. See infra notes 111–29 and accompanying text (describing how the Court defends
substantive canons on the basis that they are consistent with congressional intent).
24. See infra Part III.B (arguing that substantive canons represent conventions about
the interpretation of language).
25. 545 U.S. 967.
26. See infra notes 297–301 and accompanying text (describing the strong stare decisis
doctrine as applied in statutory interpretation cases).
27. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982.
28. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 59
(2006) (describing Chevron as a “moderate” approach).
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that the judiciary should independently determine statutory meaning
but defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes,
Chevron appears to reflect a moderate accommodation between judicial supremacy over interpretive matters and agency control over policy. If, however, as some have assumed, Chevron forces courts to
change their interpretive methodologies and exclude application of
various interpretive tools,29 Chevron is a radical doctrine. In contrast,
it is a far less significant doctrine if it does not require significant
changes to statutory interpretation methodology, it is routinely ignored by courts, and it does not constrain judicial discretion because
it allows judges to decide cases in accordance with their ideological
preferences.
This Article will argue that the enigma of Chevron should be seen
as dissipating because the Court, uncomfortable with a strong application of the doctrine, has recently created various exceptions to it, and
thus has rendered it less distinguishable from pre-Chevron doctrine.30
Despite this Article’s extended effort to frame Chevron as a doctrine
that is less exceptional than conventional views suggest, Chevron is significant in a way that few scholars have appreciated: It represents a
shift from a focus on factors related to agency deliberation and expertise to a primary initial focus on ambiguity determinations.31 Part II of
this Article will discuss how courts determine statutory ambiguity and
will argue that this process, which relies entirely on discretionary
choices, renders the ambiguity concept incoherent. Part III will argue
that, similar to other interpretive tools, substantive canons can be
viewed as representing conventions about the meaning of language,
rather than policy-based attempts to resolve statutory ambiguity, and
are therefore not as exceptional as many scholars claim. Further, statutory interpretation, regardless of the methodology used, can only estimate congressional intent, and the Supreme Court has described
substantive canons as helping determine congressional intent.
Part IV will argue that pursuant to the Court’s understanding of
substantive canons, they should be considered equally in Chevron and

29. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining that the majority view among
legal scholars is that substantive canons should not be applied in the Chevron context).
30. See infra notes 119–29 and accompanying text (describing the exception to Chevron
for issues of major importance); see also infra notes 266–72 and accompanying text
(describing the exception to Chevron for agency interpretations that were not made pursuant to sufficiently formal procedures).
31. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 838 n.26 (finding that most invalidations of
agency action involve disputes over whether a statute is ambiguous).
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non-Chevron cases.32 Part V will argue that considering the arbitrary
nature of concluding that statutory language is ambiguous, Chevron’s
focus on ambiguity should be eliminated, which will further attenuate
the doctrine’s exceptional nature and conform it to the pre-Chevron
deference doctrine. Doing so would still render Chevron as meaningful due to Brand X. Instead of Brand X’s focus on a previous court’s
ambiguity determination—an archeological dig that will undoubtedly
prove to be frustrating—reviewing courts should treat the Brand X understanding of the relationship between courts and agencies as a relaxation of the traditional stare decisis standard.33 Thus, Chevron
should be viewed as transforming the stare decisis doctrine in the administrative state, but not as transforming statutory interpretation
methodology.
II. THE DISCRETIONARY NATURE OF THE AMBIGUITY DETERMINATION
IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION CASES
The concept of ambiguity is important in the modern administrative state, even though the determination of whether statutory language is ambiguous has challenged both courts and scholars. Such an
assertion may seem surprising. After all, the generic description of
ambiguity as an expression that can be understood in more than one
sense is conceptually simple.34 Describing differing types of ambiguity
is similarly straightforward. A statute can, for example, contain semantic ambiguities due to the multiplicities of dictionary meanings
for particular words or syntactic ambiguities due to the “uncertainties
of modification or reference within the particular statute.”35
A. Defining Ambiguity
Despite the seemingly straightforward nature of the ambiguity
definition, courts have struggled to adapt it to legal usage.36 Consider
the hodgepodge of differing, and generally unhelpful, standards
32. This Article will not offer a first-order defense of substantive canons, but rather will
argue that if courts continue to consider substantive canons to be legitimate interpretive
tools, they should not distinguish between Chevron and non-Chevron applications of these
canons.
33. See infra Part V.B.
34. See Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 859, 860 (2004) (defining ambiguity as “an expression [that] can be understood in
more than one distinct sense”).
35. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 46 (1975).
36. See Solan, supra note 34, at 859 (noting that “the concept of ambiguity is itself
perniciously ambiguous” (emphasis omitted)).
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courts have used for describing statutory ambiguity.37 Often these
definitions are circular, declaring that a statute is ambiguous merely if
it is unclear.38 Other definitions focus on the interpreter rather than
the text. One common definition, for example, posits that ambiguity
“exists when a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably
well-informed persons in two or more different senses,”39 but it is also
often asserted that language is not ambiguous “simply because the
parties in litigation differ concerning its meaning.”40 Courts are thus
left with a definition that if not so inclusive as to be unworkable, is
certainly facially indeterminate.41
Other common definitions are too narrow to be taken literally.
For example, one definition is that “a provision of the law is ambiguous only . . . when it is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning.”42 In the Chevron context, this definition would mean that an
agency interpretation would receive deference only if it was at least as
persuasive as the competing interpretation. Such a view would give a
narrow scope to deference, and is thus in tension with Chevron’s realist
observation that statutory interpretation often involves policy determinations that agencies are best suited to resolve.43
Some definitions explicitly indicate that the determination of ambiguity depends on context. For example, one definition is that “a
provision is ambiguous when, despite a studied examination of the
statutory context, the natural reading of a provision remains elusive.”44 Finally, another common formulation simply tracks the generic definition of ambiguity and states that a statute is ambiguous if it
37. See infra notes 38–42, 44–45 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Nutri/System, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 278, 282 (E.D. Va. 1991)
(“An ambiguity exists when the language is difficult to comprehend or lacks clearness and
definiteness.”).
39. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:2, at 13 (7th ed. 2007).
40. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 624 A.2d 1191, 1198 (Del.
1993).
41. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2093 (1990) (“An understanding that would allow the agency to prevail merely because
there is some room for disagreement would pose an undue threat to the basic principle of
congressional supremacy in lawmaking, risking as it would administrative subversion of
statutory standards.”).
42. Mayor of Lansing v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 680 N.W.2d 840, 847 (Mich. 2004)
(emphasis omitted).
43. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115
YALE L.J. 2580, 2589 (2006) (noting that “statutory ambiguities often cannot be resolved
without judgments of policy”).
44. In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 369 (3d Cir. 2004).
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is “susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.”45 Black’s
Law Dictionary is thus undoubtedly accurate when it asserts that “judicial usage sanctions the application of the word ‘ambiguity’ to describe any kind of doubtful meaning of words, phrases or longer
statutory provisions,”46 but even this description fails to note that
courts are not required to label a provision ambiguous just because it
has a doubtful meaning.
Determining ambiguity in statutory interpretation cases is complicated by the tendency of courts to conflate ambiguity with vagueness.47 The distinction between these two concepts is not trivial,
however, because vagueness, even more so than ambiguity, is a characterizing feature of legal discourse.48 A term is vague if it presents borderline difficulties.49 For example, when is something green and not
brown or blue? Vagueness can also be a species of wanted or unwanted generality in the sense that the term or provision is underspecific because it fails to provide sufficient detail for the purpose at
issue.50 For example, the statement “[s]ome event will happen at
some time” is vague in the under-specific sense.51
The under-specific sense of vagueness includes “hedging terms,”
which delegate not only the responsibility of applying a word in actual
circumstances (its “extension”), but also the criteria that define it in
the abstract (its “intension”).52 Hedging terms, which include such
words as “reasonable” and other modifiers (such as “just,” “due,”
45. In re Rogers, 513 F.3d 212, 226 (5th Cir. 2008) (“For the language to be considered
ambiguous, however, it must be susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation or
more than one accepted meaning.”).
46. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 88 (8th ed. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
47. See Solan, supra note 34, at 860 (explaining that legal writers and judges “use the
word ‘ambiguity’ to refer to all kinds of indeterminacy,” including vagueness).
48. See VIJAY K. BHATIA ET AL., VAGUENESS IN NORMATIVE TEXTS 9 (2005) (stating that “a
number of studies show that a certain degree of vagueness is a characterising feature of
legal discourse”); see also Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1109, 1126–27 (2008) (“Even the most precise term has the potential for becoming
vague upon confronting the unexpected . . . and so no amount of precision can wall off
every possibility of future but now unforeseen and even unforeseeable vagueness.”).
49. See Roy A. Sorensen, The Ambiguity of Vagueness and Precision, 70 PAC. PHIL. Q. 174,
174 (1989) (explaining that “a statement is vague iff [sic] it is borderline . . . or could have
been borderline”).
50. See id. at 175 (“[V]agueness is a species of unwanted generality and does not imply
inquiry-resistance.”).
51. See id. (explaining that “underspecific statements, by definition, fail to give us
enough detail for the purpose at hand”).
52. See Michel Paradis, Just Reasonable: Can Linguistic Analysis Help Us Know What It Is to
Be Reasonable?, 47 JURIMETRICS 169, 170 (2007) (explaining that “‘hedges’ . . . delegate not
only the extension of a word but its intension”).
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“proper,” and “fair”), contribute to linguistic uncertainty by taking
specific words and loosening the standard for how they apply.53 Despite their nature, or rather because of it, hedging terms are ubiquitous in statutes.54 While it may be desirable in an ease-ofinterpretation sense for legal texts to be maximally determinate and
precise, they also must be drafted to cover every relevant situation.55
Indeed, it is quite common for Congress to use vague terminology to
enact a sufficiently broad statute to give the relevant agency regulatory
flexibility.56
B. The Judicial Conflation of Ambiguity Determination and Ambiguity
Resolution
The lack of a coherent legal definition of ambiguity and the conflation of ambiguity with vagueness help illustrate the problematic nature of the ambiguity concept in legal discourse, although these issues
are peripheral to the central problem of how ambiguity determinations are made by judges. Consider the following sentence, taken
from a linguistics text, intended to be an example of a syntactically
ambiguous sentence: “Lizards are green and brown.”57 The following
arguably are possible interpretations of this sentence: (1) lizards are a
color that falls between green and brown; (2) some parts of the bodies
of lizards are green and other parts are brown; (3) some types of lizards are green and other types are brown; and (4) lizards look green
under some conditions, but look brown under other conditions.58
1. The Judicial Use of Contextual Evidence to Determine Ambiguity
In light of the multiple possible interpretations of the above sentence, it might seem likely that judges would agree that the sentence is
ambiguous. In fact, such declarations of ambiguity should be routine
because “[a]mbiguity is ubiquitous in natural language.”59 Judges
53. See id. at 172–73 (discussing legal hedging terms).
54. See id. at 172 (describing the excessive use of legal hedging terms in rules, such as
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
55. See BHATIA ET AL., supra note 48, at 10 (describing the inherent tension between
determinate language and all-inclusive language).
56. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 614–17 (2009) (arguing that courts err when they construe statutory text as if Congress intended the text to
have a relatively specific meaning, and that courts should instead realize that Congress is
eschewing specificity in favor of agency delegation).
57. EDITH MORAVCSIK, AN INTRODUCTION TO SYNTACTIC THEORY 15 (2006).
58. See id. at 16–17 (discussing the possible interpretations of the sentence “[l]izards
are green and brown”).
59. Patrizia Tabossi & Francesco Zardon, Processing Ambiguous Words in Context, 32 J.
MEMORY & LANGUAGE 359, 359 (1993); see also Thomas Wasow et al., The Puzzle of Ambiguity,

R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-4\MLR401.txt

unknown

2010]

OF

THE IMPORTANCE

Seq: 13

25-AUG-10

BEING AMBIGUOUS

8:22

803

tend to conflate the resolution of ambiguity with its identification,
however, perhaps due to the important legal effects of an ambiguity
declaration.60 Thus, courts would undoubtedly evaluate the above
sentence by asserting that a consideration of the relevant context will
reveal the sentence’s intended meaning, thereby rendering the language unambiguous.61 Indeed, if syntax is considered to be the interface between form and meaning in linguistics, in the statutory
interpretation context it is considered to be the interface between language interpretation and congressional intent.62
2. Statutory Interpretation Methodologies and the Estimation of
Congressional Intent
A commitment to labeling a provision ambiguous only when the
context fails to reveal the “correct” interpretation creates numerous
problems for the interpretive enterprise. One overarching problem is
that it makes the identification of permissible contextual evidence
crucial.63 If all agreed that the contextual evidence that judges considered accurately resolved linguistic uncertainty, the judicial conflation of ambiguity identification and resolution would be insignificant.
Unfortunately, as explained below, determining the accuracy of the
various interpretive tools that courts consider to be part of the statutory context would be a daunting endeavor.64 Before considering
whether the accuracy of an interpretive tool can be empirically validated, however, it is necessary to consider the preliminary question of
whether one should be epistemologically skeptical about the coherence of labeling an interpretation as accurate or inaccurate.
One view of the problem of indeterminacy is that statutory language is inherently uncertain because its meaning can only emerge in
communication, and interpretive choices are therefore constrained
only by the self-interest of judges.65 Under this theory, interpretation
in MORPHOLOGY AND THE WEB OF GRAMMAR 265, 268–70 (C. Orhan Orgun & Peter Sells
eds., 2005) (describing ambiguity as being pervasive in the English language).
60. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (providing an example of a definition of
ambiguity that conflates these two concepts).
61. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (“Ambiguity is a creature not of
definitional possibilities but of statutory context . . . .”).
62. See MORAVCSIK, supra note 57, at 3 (indicating that syntax is the interface between
form and meaning in linguistics).
63. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining that courts will only deem a
provision ambiguous when the context cannot inform the interpretation).
64. See infra Part II.B.4.
65. See BHATIA ET AL., supra note 48, at 13 (describing the belief of some scholars that
legal language is inherently indeterminate); Randal N. M. Graham, What Judges Want: Judicial Self-Interest and Statutory Interpretation, 30 STATUTE L. REV. 38, 39 (2009) (describing the

R

R
R

R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-4\MLR401.txt

804

unknown

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

Seq: 14

25-AUG-10

8:22

[VOL. 69:791

involves the manipulation of text in furtherance of the interpreter’s
preferences.66 A deconstructionist view of interpretation, though, is
obviously unhelpful in resolving methodological disputes and is inconsistent with the consensus among judges that they are the faithful
agents of Congress in matters of statutory interpretation.67 Moreover,
while empirical data might suggest that ideology plays a central role in
interpretation, it does not follow that judges do not take language
seriously.68
Nevertheless, even advocates of traditional approaches to legal
scholarship must concede that the judiciary’s unsystematic approach
to matters of statutory interpretation precludes agreement on a methodology for determining whether an interpretation is accurate.69
Modern statutory interpretation, both inside and outside of the administrative state, is replete with philosophical and jurisprudential disputes. Even the most fundamental first-order principle of statutory
interpretation—its ultimate goal—is subject to widespread disagreement. Is the proper goal to, as textualists claim, discern congressional
intent through “the public meaning of the enacted text, understood
in context”?70 Or is it, as intentionalists claim, to interpret the text
consistently with the purpose of the legislation or the intent of
Congress?71
Regardless of the methodology chosen, congressional intent,
however it is framed, can rarely, if ever, be determined with absolute
certainty. This is especially true with regard to the current dominant
methods of statutory interpretation, which are originalist in orientadeconstructionist view that interpretive choices are constrained only by the self-interest of
judges).
66. See Graham, supra note 65, at 40 (explaining that judicial statutory interpretation is
subject to the price theory, whereby one chooses the path of least relative cost to guide
decisionmaking).
67. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2393–94 (2003)
(“In our constitutional system, it is widely assumed that federal judges must act as Congress’s faithful agents.”).
68. See Solan, supra note 34, at 865 (arguing that judges do take language arguments
seriously, but may ultimately rely on these arguments to reach a result that they perceive to
be fair).
69. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085, 2086 (2002) (“American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and
consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
70. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005).
71. See id. at 424 (stating that “whereas intentionalists believe that legislatures have
coherent and identifiable but unexpressed policy intentions, textualists believe that the only
meaningful collective legislative intentions are those reflected in the public meaning of the
final statutory text”).
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tion and hence typically seek to discern the intent of a previous Congress.72 Thus, the process of interpretation is essentially a probability
estimation of congressional intent, and interpretive tools can only assist in this estimation.73
To textualists, the concept of statutory interpretation as estimation should be readily accepted. Textualists focus on the public
meaning of a text, largely because of the uncertainties of determining
actual congressional intent.74 Nevertheless, while by definition textualists argue that determining actual congressional intent is impossible,
they must also concede that their efforts to determine the public
meaning of language are also estimations. It is well accepted that, for
example, Congress sometimes drafts linguistically indeterminate language that intentionally leaves unanswered questions in an effort to
delegate issues to other actors.75 Even when delegation is not intended, statutes are often vague or ambiguous for various reasons, including legislative compromises, the inherent imprecision of
language, and the difficulty of drafting language to address unknowable future events.76 For these reasons, it is typically difficult to assert
that there is only one correct public meaning. The acceptance of the
textualist abstraction from intent to public meaning is therefore not
72. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 n.7 (1991) (“The ‘will of
Congress’ we look to is not a will evolving from Session to Session, but a will expressed and
fixed in a particular enactment.”). As Einer Elhauge has argued, estimating the intent of
the current Congress is often an easier task than estimating the intent of a previous Congress. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2027, 2029–30 (2002) (arguing that statutory ambiguities should be resolved by default
rules that are designed to minimize the expected dissatisfaction of the current preferences
of the political branches that could be enacted into law).
73. Cf. Paradis, supra note 52, at 175 (“The biggest obstacle for any linguistic analysis is
always how to measure the words you are studying.”).
74. See John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2009, 2011 (2006) (“[T]he presumption of deliberate drafting but untidy compromise is more respectful of the central place of compromise in the constitutional design of
the legislative process.”).
75. See Bressman, supra note 56, at 550–51 (explaining that “Congress may delegate to
an agency not only the authority to implement the statute but, implicitly, the authority to
interpret it as well—that is, to specify its meaning”); Gary Lawson, Dirty Dancing—The FDA
Stumbles with the Chevron Two-Step: A Response to Professor Noah, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 936
(2008) (arguing that “given the demise of the nondelegation doctrine, there will be many
statutes for which there is no ‘correct’ interpretation” (footnote call number omitted)).
76. See Wasow et al., supra note 59, at 268–70 (describing the ubiquitous nature of
vagueness and ambiguity in the English language); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1241 (2002) (“There is simply too much law
today, governing too many subjects, for legislators to address every important policy question that might arise under their statutes.”).
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sufficient to surmount the reality that even a textualist approach to
interpretation involves estimations of meaning.77
Intentionalists must similarly concede that their methodology
seeks only to estimate congressional intent.78 In addition to the difficulties associated with the very concept of determining the “intent” of
a multi-member body, Congress frequently is unable or unwilling to
express an intent regarding many potential applications of any given
statute.79 Some intentionalists, such as Justice Breyer, have thus advocated that the intent sought should be an objectified one that focuses
on “how a (hypothetical) reasonable member of Congress, given the
statutory language, structure, history, and purpose, would have answered the question, had it been presented.”80 The advocacy of such
an approach implicitly concedes that, similar to textualism, intentionalism’s methodology can, at best, only attempt to estimate congressional intent.
3. Probabilistic Determinations of Meaning
If the identification of ambiguity is, in legal discourse, thought to
be determined through the consideration of contextual evidence,
which involves estimations of congressional intent, it follows that one
must consider the probabilistic threshold that an interpretation must
77. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 642 (2002) (“Any statute that seeks to
affect human conduct—especially statutes seeking strong changes in conduct . . . will be
adopted under conditions of uncertainty . . . . Legislators delegate a lot of lawmaking to
agencies because of the difficulty they face when correcting their own errors, including
cognitive dissonance as well as the excessive costs of monitoring and re-legislating.”).
78. Some would distinguish intentionalists from purposivists when describing the dominant interpretive methodologies, with intentionalists focusing on specific congressional
intent and purposivists focusing on statutory purpose. Regardless of whether such a bright
line distinction is valid, purposivists explicitly maintain that estimation of specific congressional intent is not the goal of statutory interpretation. See Martin H. Redish & Dennis
Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive Tension: A Lesson in Statutory
Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 95 (2008) (advocating “common sense and an attempt
to translate underlying purpose into legal reality, rather than narrow, shortsighted adherence to textual literalism or legislative history”). Thus, they too would agree that, at best,
courts can only estimate congressional intent.
79. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983)
(“Because legislatures comprise many members, they do not have ‘intents’ or ‘designs,’
hidden yet discoverable.”); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 241–45 (1992) (describing the fiction of
collective congressional intent). But see Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws:
The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 427–30 (2005)
(defending the concept that a collective body can possess a discernable intent).
80. Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245,
266 (2002) (emphasis omitted).
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meet to allow a statutory provision to be deemed unambiguous.81 After all, irrespective of the definition of ambiguity, it is possible that
Chevron was intended to establish its own idiosyncratic standard for
identifying the threshold at which statutory provisions will be deemed
ambiguous and deference will be given to agency interpretations. Indeed, as the Chevron opinion indicated, courts are required to accept
agency interpretations that are not as persuasive as competing interpretations, which raises the possibility that the definition of ambiguity
in Chevron should be considered more capacious than in other
contexts.82
The probabilistic threshold that an interpretation must meet in
order to render a statutory provision unambiguous under Chevron is
similar to the general concept of ambiguity, which is also under-conceptualized.83 Some have asserted that, in practice, the reviewing
court will decide the case at Step One if there is a “clearly preferred
meaning.”84 There is no consensus regarding this standard, however.
Justice Scalia, for example, has stated that textualists will tend to confine Chevron deference to relatively close cases, suggesting that the
agency interpretation must be, at the least, almost as persuasive as the
competing interpretation.85 In contrast, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated that it would not decide a
case at Step One, and thus reject an agency’s interpretation, unless it
was confident “beyond reasonable doubt” that the agency’s interpreta-

81. Cf. Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 859–60 (1992) (explaining
that interpretation involves a determination of significance and a standard of proof).
82. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11
(1984) (stating that a reasonable interpretation is not necessarily the “reading the court
would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding”); see also
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)
(“Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction of the statute, even if
the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory
interpretation.”).
83. See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 396 (2005) (“Questions of
this sort call to mind the criterion for Chevron deference: when is one construction of a
statute so superior to the alternatives that the administering agency has no option but to
use it, and how close must the alternatives get in order to become ‘permissible’?”).
84. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 991
(1992) (emphasis omitted) (explaining that the Step One “inquiry has tended in practice
to devolve into an inquiry about whether the statute as a whole generates a clearly preferred
meaning”).
85. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 515 (“Only when the court concludes that the policy furthered by neither textually
possible interpretation will be clearly ‘better’ (in the sense of achieving what Congress
apparently wished to achieve) will it, pursuant to Chevron, yield to the agency’s choice.”).
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tion was incorrect.86 Such a standard would accept agency interpretations that are vastly inferior to competing interpretations. Thus,
although it is possible that the definition of ambiguity in Chevron
should be considered more capacious than in other contexts, the extent to which it is more capacious is unclear.
4. Empirically Measuring the Accuracy of Interpretive Tools
So far, this Article has observed that the judicial determination of
ambiguity is highly discretionary due to the indeterminate and unhelpful definitions of ambiguity, the conflation of ambiguity identification and its resolution, the nature of language and legislative
drafting, and the lack of consensus regarding the probabilistic threshold an interpretation must meet in order to render a statutory provision unambiguous. Adding to the discretionary nature of the
ambiguity inquiry is the non-empirically based foundation for interpretive rules.87 If the definition of ambiguity requires a determination of the probabilistic threshold an interpretation must reach in
order to be chosen instead of an alternative interpretation, the probabilistic force each interpretive tool possesses must also be considered.
An objective, systematic approach to determining the accuracy of interpretive rules is unlikely to develop, however.88
Consider, for example, the numerous difficulties associated with
determining the accuracy of interpretive tools. In order to determine
the probabilistic force of any given interpretive tool, it must be
demonstrated that, through empirical analysis or otherwise, an interpretive tool actually reveals congressional intent. Even if judges could
agree on the goal of statutory interpretation, whether it is to find the
specific or objectified intent of Congress or the public meaning of the
language, it is unlikely that a consensus could exist regarding how to
measure the accuracy of an interpretive tool.89 In addition, even if a
consensus could be reached, it would still be necessary to set a standard for determining whether the probabilistic value of the tool was
sufficiently strong to warrant judicial use. If, for example, it could be
86. Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 544 (1947) (noting that “these rules of construction are not in any true sense rules of
law,” but are “axioms of experience” that “were abstracted, taken out of the context of
actuality, and, as it were, codified in treatises”).
88. See id. at 543–44 (suggesting that there is no precision to the application of interpretive rules).
89. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text (revealing the disagreement about
the goal of statutory interpretation).
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estimated that a given canon approximated congressional intent fiftyfive percent of the time, would such an interpretive tool be considered to adequately reflect congressional intent?90
Another fundamental problem is that it is not possible to measure the accuracy of an interpretive tool in isolation because judges
typically consider various interpretive tools when interpreting statutes.91 Thus, it is often unclear how important any individual interpretive tool was to the judge’s selection of the particular
interpretation. Other problems also contribute to making accuracy
determinations difficult. First, interpretive principles such as canons
are frequently referred to by courts as “tools” of interpretation rather
than “rules,” which indicates that even if a canon is applicable according to its definition, its application is non-mandatory if the resulting
interpretation would be inaccurate for some reason.92 The application of canons is therefore highly contextual because they merely set
forth presumptions that can be rebutted. In addition, determinations
of accuracy would be particularly challenging considering that many
interpretive tools are triggered by statutory ambiguity, which is, as this
Article has argued, an inherently subjective interpretation that is
highly amenable to judicial manipulation.93
Even if a methodology for determining the accuracy of interpretive tools were possible in a general sense, some common interpretive
tools are much less amenable to measurement because they are too
broad to be clearly defined and depend on the skill of the interpreter.94 Pragmatic reasoning, for example, is common in statutory
interpretation decisions, as is reliance on “common sense,” yet such
tools are not amenable to general conclusions about their accuracy.95
Moreover, it is not clear that when a judge engages in pragmatic or
90. Obviously, problems of how the probability value of a particular interpretive tool
could be quantified would present enormous difficulties.
91. See generally Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971 (2007) (discussing the various interpretive tools that the Supreme Court uses in statutory interpretation cases).
92. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (noting that
“canons are not mandatory rules,” but are guides “designed to help judges determine the
Legislature’s intent,” and that “other circumstances evidencing congressional intent can
overcome their force”).
93. See Frankfurter, supra note 87, at 544 (“In the end, language and external aids,
each accorded the authority deserved in the circumstances, must be weighed in the balance of judicial judgment.”).
94. See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
95. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65–66 (2004) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“Common sense is often more reliable than rote repetition of canons of statutory construction.”); Cross, supra note 91, at 1976–77 (discussing judicial reliance on
pragmatic reasoning in statutory interpretation cases).
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common sense reasoning, the judge is attempting to use such tools as
a proxy for congressional intent.96 In addition, some interpretive
tools require judicial expertise in order to be used effectively, such as
legislative history.97 It could, therefore, be concluded that interpretive tools like legislative history may be accurate when used by some
judges but not when used by others.
Apart from the problem of probability determinations for the various interpretive tools is the lack of a methodology for aggregating
the probabilistic force of each interpretive tool and linking this aggregate to confidence in a particular interpretation.98 One main issue is
commensurability.99 Justice Scalia has claimed that balancing tests are
roughly the equivalent of attempting to determine “whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”100 The same could
be said regarding the comparison of conflicting, or even congruent,
interpretive tools. Even if a probabilistic determination could be
made for some interpretive tools, it may not be possible to combine
these determinations with other interpretive principles, like common
sense and pragmatic reasoning, which may not allow for probabilistic
determinations.101

96. Instead, the court is engaging in a reasoning process similar to purposivists and is
focusing on the goals of the legislation and other considerations. See supra note 78
(describing purposivists’ methodology and their claim that determining congressional intent is not the goal of statutory interpretation).
97. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence:
The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998) (discussing the difficulties involved in using legislative history effectively, particularly through the lens of Holy
Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)).
98. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining the labeling of provisions as
ambiguous when the context does not reveal correct interpretations and noting that indeterminacy is in part a function of uncertainty).
99. See Frederick Schauer, Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal Text 2–5 (Feb. 18, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Maryland Law
Review) (discussing and rejecting the merits of those who espouse the view that balancing
is unconstrained because balancing, particularly when it takes a proportional form, is
rational).
100. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment).
101. It is also likely that the probability values of interpretive tools would change depending on the applicability of other interpretive rules. For example, if the Court is correct that Congress does not generally intend to change the federal/state balance, a
criminal statute that regulated formally state concerns would trigger a federalism clear
statement rule and, if the statute is ambiguous, the criminal rule of lenity. See infra note
116 and accompanying text (discussing the federalism canons). Thus, the applicability of
the federalism canon would enhance the probability value of the rule of lenity. Conversely, relevant legislative history might lower the probability value of the rule of lenity.
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The difficulties outlined above illustrate why the determination
of statutory ambiguity is highly consequential, but, at the same time,
subjective and standardless.102 The problematic nature of establishing
the accuracy of any given interpretive tool also provides one major
reason why the Court does not purport to base its methodology of
statutory interpretation on empirical evidence.103 Instead, the selection of interpretive tools to provide contextual evidence for determining ambiguity, and the persuasive force to give each interpretive tool,
are matters of judicial judgment.104 Further, courts arbitrarily designate certain interpretive tools as being applicable to ambiguity determinations and others as being applicable to only ambiguity resolution,
such as the position of some courts, including the Supreme Court on
occasion, that legislative history will only be considered if the statute is
first found to be ambiguous.105
A. Substantive Canons and Congressional Intent
Notwithstanding the difficulties involved in determining whether
interpretive tools accurately reflect congressional intent, substantive
canons, also known as normative canons, are widely viewed as being
based on policy, rather than congressional intent.106 Indeed, some
scholars have argued that substantive canons should be used to pro-

102. Cf. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 572 (2005) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (“Because ambiguity is apparently in the eye of the beholder, I remain convinced that it is unwise to treat the ambiguity vel non of a statute as determinative of
whether legislative history is consulted.”).
103. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 77 (2000) (explaining
that “[c]ourts must choose interpretive doctrines on largely empirical grounds, under conditions of severe empirical uncertainty, often without the luxury of postponing their decisions” until “new information . . . becomes available or . . . crucial experiments can be
conducted”).
104. See Frankfurter, supra note 87, at 543–44 (stating that “[i]n the end, language and
external aids” are “weighed in the balance of judicial judgment”); see also supra Part II.B.
105. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 567 (majority opinion) (indicating that a court
should consult legislative history only after first determining that the statute is ambiguous).
106. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 638 (1992) (arguing that
“even ordinary clear statement rules are particularly countermajoritarian, because they
permit the Court to override probable congressional preferences in statutory interpretation in favor of norms and values favored by the Court”); Mendelson, supra note 20, at 745
(stating that substantive canons “encod[e] some sort of value judgment”).
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tect important public values.107 The conventional view among scholars, however, is that the policy judgments underlying substantive
canons make them inconsistent with Chevron’s rationale that agencies
have been delegated authority to decide policy issues.108 Despite
these concerns, in several cases, the Court has allowed substantive canons to displace Chevron.109 Although these applications of substantive canons are highly significant because they foreclose the possibility
of deference to agency interpretations, the Court has not yet offered a
comprehensive explanation for when substantive canons should be invoked as a substitute for deference to agency interpretations. As a
result, the relationship between substantive canons and Chevron is
widely regarded as being unclear.110
The conventional characterization of substantive canons as
originating due to judicial policy concerns, as opposed to efforts to
estimate congressional intent, is problematic for various reasons. Perhaps the most important reason to question the conventional characterization is that it ignores the Court’s defense of substantive canons.
A primary reason for why many substantive canons are seen by the
107. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 41, at 2105–18 (arguing that giving preference to
certain canons over the Chevron principle is an effective means of balancing separation of
powers concerns).
108. See Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to Improve the Legislative Process: Can
It Be Done in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L. & POL. 105, 159 (1997) (“Chevron changed the
status of the substantive canons much like it has changed the courts’ authority with respect
to the resolution of methodological issues.”); Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 613 (1998) (arguing that the Chevron principle that
Congress has delegated lawmaking or interpretive authority should prevail over various
substantive canons); Mendelson, supra note 20, at 745–46 (arguing that judicial application
of substantive canons in Step One “seems inappropriate”); Merrill & Hickman, supra note
3, at 873 (“All norms and canons grounded in common law must give way to the Chevron
doctrine.”); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921, 955–56 & n.173 (1992) (arguing that Chevron “should generally prevail over the
various tie-breakers that tilt in favor of continuity”).
109. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 20–21 (2007) (applying the
preemption canon instead of Chevron); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381–82 (2005)
(applying the canon of constitutional avoidance instead of Chevron); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 696–97 (2001) (stating that if Congress had made its intent clear, the Court must
give effect to Congress’s intent, but concluding that Congress had not made a clear indication in this case); id. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (implying that the Court applied the
canon of constitutional avoidance instead of Chevron by accusing the Court of “misunderstand[ing] the principle of constitutional avoidance which it seeks to invoke”); INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298, 316–18 (2001) (applying both the “longstanding rule requiring a
clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction” and the presumption
against retroactivity instead of Chevron); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (applying the constitutional avoidance
canon instead of Chevron).
110. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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Court as fitting naturally within Step One is because the Court views
these canons as useful in determining congressional intent.
Consider the Court’s statements regarding several substantive canons. The canon of constitutional avoidance—which directs courts to
adopt a narrow, even if second-best, interpretation if doing so would
avoid a serious constitutional issue—represents a “reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises
serious constitutional doubts” and is “thus a means of giving effect to
congressional intent, not of subverting it.”111 The presumption
against retroactive application of statutes “will generally coincide with
legislative and public expectations.”112 The presumption against extraterritorial application of federal statutes reflects “the commonsense
notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in
mind.”113 The canon benefiting Native Americans “assumes Congress
intends its statutes to benefit the tribes,”114 and the immigration rule
of lenity assumes that the interpretation intended by Congress is “the
narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.”115 Similarly, several federalism canons are based on the assumption that Congress is concerned with federalism issues and desires to preserve local
authority.116
In the same way as other substantive canons, Chevron is also based
on a generalized assumption about congressional intent. The Court
has asserted that Chevron established a “presumption that Congress,
when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an
agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and
foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the
courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”117 Likewise, the Court’s recent restrictions on the scope of
111. Clark, 543 U.S. at 381–82.
112. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272 (1994).
113. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993); see also Small v. United States,
544 U.S. 385, 388–89 (2005) (stating that the Court has “adopt[ed] the legal presumption
that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial,
application”).
114. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 95 (2001).
115. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
116. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 420 (1999) (discussing the
“assumption that Congress intended to preserve local authority”); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (stating that “because the States are independent sovereigns in
our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt
state-law causes of action”); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (indicating that
the Court would “not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state governmental
functions”).
117. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996).
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Chevron have been justified on the basis of generalized assumptions
about congressional intent.118
The use of substantive canons with their tendency to direct courts
to interpret statutes narrowly against agency interests, especially when
significant issues are at stake, is consistent with the Court’s recent disinclination to extend Chevron to issues of major importance.119 At
least part of the rationale for this practice is reflected in Justice
Breyer’s claim that “Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and
answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer
themselves in the course of the statute’s daily administration.”120
Thus, if Congress did not focus on a major issue, it did not likely intend to delegate that issue to an agency to resolve.
In several recent cases, the Court has refused to extend Chevron
deference to broad agency interpretations that arguably were consistent with the plain language of the relevant statutes. In Gonzales v.
Oregon,121 for example, the Court held that the U.S. Attorney General
was not entitled to deference regarding an interpretation extending
the reach of the Controlled Substances Act to physician-assisted suicide.122 The Court refused to presume that Congress would have implicitly authorized the Attorney General to reach an issue as
“extraordinary” as the restriction of physician-assisted suicide.123 Similarly, in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co.,124 the Court argued that “[i]t is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the
determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion.”125 Additionally, in FDA v.
118. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (“It is fair to assume
generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it
provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”). For an explanation
of this restriction on Chevron’s scope, see infra notes 269–72 and accompanying text.
119. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 231–47 (2006) (explaining the “major questions” exception).
120. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,
370 (1986).
121. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
122. Id. at 274–75.
123. See id. at 267 (stating that Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Gonzales can also be seen as a case that was
influenced by substantive canons. See Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 467 (2007) (“The majority’s interpretation . . . was plainly influenced by federalism-based assumptions concerning the traditional and proper allocation
of regulatory authority over the medical profession.”). Since the major questions exception and clear statement canons both require clear evidence of congressional intent, it is
not surprising that the Court has used these doctrines interchangeably.
124. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
125. Id. at 231.
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Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,126 the Court stated that “Congress
could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and
political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”127 Other
explanations by scholars of these decisions have tied the Court’s refusal to grant Chevron deference to the agency procedures involved.128
Nevertheless, the explanation put forth by the Court is that based on
estimations of congressional intent, it is reluctant to countenance congressional delegation to agencies of important or sensitive issues.129
B. Substantive Canons and Conventions About Language
Notwithstanding the Court’s claims about the connection between substantive canons and congressional intent, these statutes narrowing substantive canons, particularly the clear statement canons,
run counter to how courts typically conceptualize statutory breadth.130
Often broad statutory language is depicted as being ambiguous or
vague, which, in the modern administrative state as Chevron exemplifies, is interpreted as evidencing an intention to delegate authority to
agencies to fill in the statutory gaps.131 Alternatively, and perhaps
more intuitively, courts often attribute breadth of meaning to broadly
worded statutes. The Court’s interpretations of the notoriously broad
and open-ended Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”)132 serve as a paradigmatic example of this approach. RICO
126. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
127. Id. at 160; see also id. at 133 (“In addition, we must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of
such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency.”).
128. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761,
764 (2007) (arguing “that the Court withheld deference” in Gonzales “because the respective administrations . . . although electorally accountable, had interpreted broad delegations in ways that were undemocratic when viewed in the larger legal and social contexts”).
129. See Sunstein, supra note 119, at 236–42 (discussing the major question trilogy).
130. Not all substantive canons are of equal strength. The classification of specific substantive canons can be difficult because courts often are vague when describing the canons
and occasionally increase or decrease their strength, but two broad categories can be identified. The weakest substantive canons are tie-breaker canons, which direct that certain
statutes be construed “liberally” or “strictly” and are considered at only the end of a court’s
search for statutory meaning. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 343–52 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing liberal versus strict construction).
In contrast to the case with the relatively weak canons that serve as tie-breakers, an interpretation must be highly persuasive in order to overcome the presumption created by the
clear statement rule. Courts are often forced to accept second-best interpretations, including the frequent creation of implied exceptions to otherwise unambiguously broad statutory language. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
131. See generally Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405 (2008) (describing the challenges posed by
broadly worded statutes that delegate lawmaking power to courts).
132. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006).
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is filled with broad and undefined terms, such as “enterprise” and
“pattern of racketeering activity.”133 Yet, the Court has stated, “‘[T]he
fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated
by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth.’”134
Application of clear statement rules, and other similar substantive
canons, changes the normal rules of interpretation that treat broad
statutory language as connoting ambiguity, vagueness, or benign
breadth. Instead, clear statement rules and other similar rules
counterintuitively construe seemingly broad statutory language as being clearly narrow in some respects. These interpretations are accomplished by the creation of “implied limitation[s] on otherwise
unambiguous general terms of the statute.”135 Thus, as illustrated
above, pursuant to the presumption against retroactivity, a statute that
is full of broad terms but is silent with respect to retroactive application is construed to be unambiguously prospective in effect.136 Similarly, pursuant to the presumption against extraterritorial application
of federal statutes, a statute that is full of broad terms but is silent with
respect to extraterritorial application is interpreted as not having an
extraterritorial reach.137
One objection to the notion of creating exceptions to broad statutory language under Chevron Step One is that a court’s task is not to
infer what Congress might have said about the issue in dispute if it had
considered the matter, but rather “‘whether Congress has directly
spoken to [the] precise question.’”138 The Court, though, has main133. See Brian Slocum, RICO and the Legislative Supremacy Approach to Federal Criminal Lawmaking, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 639, 641–48 (2000) (describing the broad nature of RICO).
134. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (alteration in original)
(quoting Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir.
1984)).
135. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 139 (2005).
136. See Nelson, supra note 83, at 384 (noting that the presumption against retroactivity
“often causes courts to infer exceptions to statutory provisions whose words, on their face,
appear to cover all pending cases”).
137. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 586 n.4 (1992) (stating that “inclusive language, by itself, is not sufficient to overcome the presumption against the extraterritorial application of statutes”).
138. Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 120–21 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)). In this
case, the Second Circuit seemed merely to be making the unremarkable point that reviewing courts must be highly confident in an interpretation before selecting it at Step One.
See id. at 124 (“Because neither the structure, purpose, nor legislative history of RESPA
§ 8(b) clearly resolves the identified textual ambiguity . . . we proceed to the second step of
Chevron analysis.”). Nevertheless, the question remains whether the application of a clear
statement rule signifies that the reviewing court believes that Congress has, albeit through
its silence, directly spoken to the issue in question or, somewhat differently, that if Con-
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tained that using canons to create limitations on broad statutory language “is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent
may be ascertained.”139 As Justice Scalia has explained with regard to
the clear statement rule against waiver of state sovereign immunity,
“[S]ince congressional elimination of state sovereign immunity is such
an extraordinary act, one would normally expect it to be explicitly
decreed [by Congress] rather than offhandedly implied—so something like a ‘clear statement’ rule is merely normal interpretation.”140
In essence, the absence of explicit statutory language is, to the
Court, in some circumstances sufficient to conclude that Congress
does not desire that a statute be interpreted as broadly as its terms
might suggest. The relevant principle is that when exceptions to a
normative proposition are “part of an antecedent understanding between speaker and listener that limits conditions of application, the
exceptions are part of the meaning” of the proposition.141 Even if
there is no evidence that Congress had considered a particular matter,
the Court is able to discern congressional intent pursuant to its conclusion that the absence of a clear congressional statement is
equivalent to a statutory qualification.142 This understanding of congressional intent is particularly justifiable with regard to modern statutes, which are often drafted in broad terms. Pursuant to this
assumption about language and congressional intent, clear statement
rules, as the Court has explained, do not resolve statutory ambiguity,
but rather assist the reviewing court in reaching a conclusion that a
statute is unambiguous.143 If the meaning of a text is derived from the
gress had considered the issue, it would have chosen the interpretation consistent with the
clear statement rule. The former would, assuming the legitimacy of the clear statement
rule, justify the reviewing court deciding the case at Step One, while the latter would make
a Step One interpretation in accordance with the canon arguably inconsistent with Chevron’s admonition to courts not to decide cases at Step One based on speculation about a
statute’s purpose.
139. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
140. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 29
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
141. See Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10 (1990)
(“When exceptions to an imperative are part of an antecedent understanding between
speaker and listener that limits conditions of application, the exceptions are part of the
meaning of the imperative.”).
142. See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 139 (2005) (“Implied limitation rules avoid applications of otherwise unambiguous statutes that would intrude on
sensitive domains in a way that Congress is unlikely to have intended had it considered the
matter.”).
143. See id. at 141 (drawing a “distinction between a canon for choosing among plausible meanings of an ambiguous statute and a clear statement rule that implies a special
substantive limit on the application of an otherwise unambiguous mandate”).
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conventions of the relevant linguistic community, then users of language must be presumed to know “the assumptions shared by the
speakers and the intended audience.”144
Although clear statement canons may seem counterintuitive in
some respects, they should not, as a class, be viewed as exogenous to
the traditional interpretive process. Clear statement canons are in
large part conventions about language, and there is no such thing as
interpretation without at least some conventions about the meaning
of language.145 Indeed, interpretation necessarily requires an understanding of acontextual conventions. At a basic level, if the relevant
interpretive community did not possess a general understanding of
words, sentences, grammar, and syntax, communication would be impossible.146 Thus, at least some conventions add benefits to the interpretive enterprise, such as improved coherency and consistency of
interpretations.147 These conventions necessarily exist in all widely accepted interpretive methodologies. Few proponents of contextual
conventions, such as the principle that the plain meaning of statutory
text should be subordinate to legislative intent, would argue that
courts should exclusively use a purposivist approach unanchored by
statutory text along with any conventions for interpreting that text.148
It is natural that many of the conventions for the interpretation
of legal texts would not be shared by the interpreters of nonlegal
texts. As the branch with the primary responsibility of determining
the rules and principles of interpretation, the linguistic subcommunity of judges will shape the linguistic understandings relevant to
144. Manning, supra note 67, at 2467 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
see also id. (explaining that “interpreters should consult the assumptions of a reasonable
person conversant with legal conventions,” which include such things as recognizing the
defense of justification even with regard to unqualified statutory crimes).
145. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1152 (2008) (arguing that determining the plain meaning of a text requires a normative
baseline).
146. See Schauer, supra note 48, at 1120 (arguing that “[w]ithout knowing something
about words and sentences and grammar and syntax as general or acontextual rules (or,
even better, conventions), we could never hope to understand each other”).
147. See Easterbrook, supra note 79, at 540 (stating that canons serve “as off-the-rack
provisions that spare legislators the costs of anticipating all possible interpretive problems
and legislating solutions for them”). Arguably, the stronger the substantive canon, the
more likely it is to improve the consistency of interpretations because such canons require
more specific language in order to be overcome. See Slocum, supra note 19, at 381–84
(arguing that the “superclear statement” rule regarding the repeal of habeas corpus jurisdiction provides guidance to Congress and courts (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
148. See Molot, supra note 28, at 29–30 (stating that “few judges or scholars today espouse the strong purposivism that textualists set out to discredit two decades ago”).
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the interpretation of statutes, which will reflect the values of the legal
system.149 As David Shapiro has observed, courts are naturally conservative and seek legal coherence by minimizing disruption of the
status quo.150 Substantive canons therefore generally narrow statutory
meaning.151 Many of these narrowing conventions are long-standing
and uncontroversial. For example, “textualists read mens rea requirements into otherwise unqualified criminal statutes because established
judicial practice calls for interpreting such statutes in light of common
law mental state requirements.”152 Even the more controversial substantive canons, though, can likewise be defended on the basis that
they establish conventions about language that form the baseline for
legislative drafting and interpretation.
C. Substantive Canons May Set Forth Inaccurate Conventions About
Language Usage
It may be accurate to theorize that substantive canons are merely
conventions about the meaning of language, but once it is agreed that
the role of interpretive rules is to estimate congressional intent, substantive canons nevertheless can be objected to on the basis that they
set forth inaccurate conventions. The Court may generally claim that
the substantive canons it creates reflect congressional intent, but, at
best, such claims can be accepted only as broad and non-empirically
based generalizations. In one sense this should not be surprising because the nature of rules (and substantive canons can be seen as putting forth rule-like statements about how language should be
interpreted) is such that they, to varying degrees, necessarily draw arbitrary lines and are both over- and under-inclusive.153 Statutory interpretation, in a very limited sense, accounts for this problem. As
John Manning has argued, the reality that rules are over- and underinclusive is part of what inspires the absurdity doctrine, which gives
judges the power to ignore the plain import of provisions if doing so
149. Cf. Schauer, supra note 48, at 1122–23 (discussing the distinction between ordinary
language and legal language).
150. See Shapiro, supra note 108, at 925 (arguing that canons are consistent with the
“judicial tendency to favor continuity over change”).
151. See Brian G. Slocum, The Problematic Nature of Contractionist Statutory Interpretations,
102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 307, 310 (2008) (“Substantive canons of interpretation . . .
almost uniformly direct courts to interpret statutes narrowly.”).
152. Manning, supra note 67, at 2466.
153. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988) (stating that “[r]ules overshoot or undershoot”);
Nelson, supra note 83, at 399 (explaining that “rules . . . are simultaneously over- and
under-inclusive: they apply in some situations not warranted by their underlying purposes,
and they fail to reach other situations that those purposes would seem to cover”).
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would avoid an absurd result.154 Nevertheless, even allowing for the
natural imprecision of rules, substantive canons in particular may be
based on erroneous assumptions about Congress and the legislative
process.
Even if one accepts the legitimacy of substantive canons, it cannot
be argued that these canons attempt to answer questions about specific congressional intent with regard to any particular statute.155
Rather, like most other tools of interpretation, canons purport implicitly to reflect a kind of universal congressional intent. All substantive
canons apply across distinct time periods, and many purport to apply
equally to diverse subject matter. The intertemporal dimension of
substantive canons is such that each canon assumes that all Congresses
share the same intent. Thus, courts assume, for example, that every
Congress desires that the ambiguities in the statutes that it enacts be
interpreted in favor of immigrants and Native Americans.156 Similarly, courts assume that every Congress desires the same division of
interpretive responsibility between courts and agencies and thus the
same deference rules, as reflected in the fact that courts do not
reevaluate the Chevron doctrine each time the composition of Congress or the Executive Branch changes.157
154. See Manning, supra note 67, at 2394 (stating that the “absurdity doctrine rests on
the intuition that some such outcomes are so unthinkable that the federal courts may
safely presume that legislators did not foresee those particular results”).
155. Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000
WIS. L. REV. 205, 250 (“In cases involving a substantive canon, the canon constitutes a
factor in the Justices’ thinking that does not derive closely from original congressional
intent, however defined.”).
156. See supra text accompanying note 115 (explaining the immigration rule of lenity).
A few well-known canons cannot be consistent with congressional intent. For example, it is
doubtful that Congress desires that ambiguities in criminal statutes be interpreted in favor
of defendants. See generally Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why
Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599 (discussing the
general principle that Congress does not often enact legislation that benefits defendants).
Indeed, many state legislatures have enacted legislation that abolishes this rule of lenity.
See Rosenkranz, supra note 69, at 2094 n.25 (listing states that have abrogated the rule of
lenity). Thus, interpretive tools such as the criminal rule of lenity must be defended on
grounds other than congressional intent. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, while commentators may speculate that a given interpretive tool is inconsistent
with congressional intent, there is no methodology available to validate such speculation.
See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing the difficulties associated with determining whether interpretive tools are consistent with congressional intent).
157. See Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation and Decision Theory, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 329,
357 n.47 (2007) (book review) (“The general presumption announced in Chevron—that
when Congress entrusts the administration of a statutory provision to a federal agency,
Congress should usually be understood to be letting the agency take the lead in resolving
any indeterminacies in the provision—is thus a paradigmatic normative canon.”); Jordan
Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of Stare Decisis as Applied to
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Substantive canons also possess a questionable trans-subject matter dimension. The trans-subject matter dimension means that each
canon, at least theoretically, is used when applicable, regardless of the
subject of the legislation or the affected groups. Thus, for example,
the presumption against retroactivity applies with equal force to both
legislation affecting business interests, even though Congress may be
quite protective of business, and immigrants, even in cases where a
Congress particularly hostile to immigrants had passed extremely punitive, anti-immigrant legislation.158
The reality that substantive canons are subject to crude intertemporal and subject matter assumptions does not serve to distinguish
them from other interpretive tools, especially textual canons, because
they are subject to the same assumptions.159 A more fundamental
claim about substantive canons, though, is that they are idiosyncratically selected by the Court according to its policy preferences, which
contributes to the poor connection between the canons and congressional intent.160 Indeed, considering the distributive implications of
substantive canons, it is not difficult to imagine ideologically driven
judges, and others, being attracted to them.161 The Court itself has
often indicated that substantive canons are not entirely based on estimations of congressional intent. For example, the Court has indicated that the presumption against retroactivity helps protect
disadvantaged groups that might be the natural targets of retroactive
legislation, and that the rule of lenity acts as a nondelegation device
that forces Congress to legislate explicitly and precisely in the area of

Judicial Methodology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 703 (2008) (explaining that “the Chevron doctrine involves a presumption about congressional intent, much like some textual canons”
because “[t]he Court presumes that Congress intended to delegate gap-filling authority in
ambiguous statutes to the agencies implementing them rather than the courts”).
158. See Slocum, supra note 19, at 408 (noting that the Court has applied the presumption against retroactivity in immigration cases even in instances where the provision at issue
was part of punitive, anti-immigrant legislation).
159. See infra notes 190–94 and accompanying text (explaining the assumptions underlying textual canons).
160. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 106, at 595–96 (“[S]ubstantive canons are not
policy neutral. They represent value choices by the Court.”).
161. See Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the
Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 572 (2005) (stating that clear statement
rules “inevitably have controversial normative and distributive implications”). The distributional effects of substantive canons are undoubtedly why scholars generally focus on
proposing new substantive canons, as opposed to new textual canons. See, e.g., Jonathan R.
Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 242–50 (1986) (proposing a canon of statutory construction
that would preserve economic liberty in the face of majoritarian political processes).
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criminal law.162 Of course, the Chevron doctrine can similarly be described as being at least partially motivated by policy considerations
rather than by an attempt to estimate congressional intent.163
Even if substantive canons may not capture the subjective intent
of Congress, they can, as explained above, still be defended on the
basis that they represent the interpretive conventions that Congress is
obligated to consider when drafting legislation.164 The Court has
maintained that the stability of the conventions of interpretation is
more important than whether the conventions accurately estimate
congressional intent.165 Thus, if it seems counterintuitive that broad
statutory terms do not necessarily connote broad statutory meaning
when sensitive areas are threatened, Congress, at least theoretically,
has the ability to overcome ex ante the presumptions created by canons by drafting explicit legislation.166
The theory that substantive canons accurately estimate congressional intent because they exist as background conventions about language that Congress can access when drafting statutory language is
subject to various objections. One important objection is that, as empirical inquiries have shown, it is questionable how much attention
Congress pays to the rules of interpretation when drafting legislation.167 Even if Congress purported to consider substantive canons
when drafting legislation, it is often difficult to assess exactly how the
potential applicability of substantive canons should impact the draft162. See United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008) (stating that the rule of
lenity “places the weight of inertia upon the party that can best induce Congress to speak
more clearly”); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315 n.39 (2001) (noting that concerns about
retroactive laws become more acute when they target an “unpopular group,” and that “because noncitizens cannot vote, they are particularly vulnerable to adverse legislation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
163. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 106, at 618–19 (describing Chevron as one of
many policy-based substantive canons of statutory interpretation).
164. See supra Part III.B (arguing that substantive canons can be viewed as conventions
about how legal language should be interpreted).
165. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) (indicating that “‘it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be
settled right’” (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
166. See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2106 (2000)
(explaining that the presumption against preemption “makes sense, however, if one considers the traditional assumption not as a dice-loading, ambiguity-resolving presumption,
but rather simply as the background in which Congress legislates and therefore against
which courts interpret the legislation”).
167. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 597–605 (2002) (finding that Congress does not
pay particular attention to the rules of interpretation when drafting legislation).
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ing.168 The identity, scope, and level of clarity required of applicable
canons are often difficult to gauge, partly because they are always subject to change, and changes are often applied retroactively.169 Even
the canons that do not represent specific ideological commitments,
such as the canon of constitutional avoidance, give the judge significant latitude to apply the canon in order to achieve ideological
results.170
In addition, even assuming a static list of canons, it is fictional to
think that many of the canons could be part of a legislative drafting
bargain. John Manning has argued that the absurdity doctrine cannot
be considered a part of the legislative bargain due to its open-ended
and ad hoc nature.171 The same could be said of some of the substantive canons. It is plausible that judicial application of some clear statement rules, such as the presumption against retroactivity, can be
predicted ex ante by Congress and thus could be part of the legislative
bargain.172 Such a conclusion is less plausible with regard to many of
the other canons, however, such as the canon of constitutional avoidance and the weaker, tie-breaker canons, which apply in a much more
general and diffuse manner.173
168. See id. at 598–99 (explaining that legislators are familiar with the canons of construction, but “[t]he real issue was whether and how this knowledge was used” in the drafting process (emphasis added)); see also Dinh, supra note 166, at 2085 (“Notwithstanding its
repeated claims to the contrary, the Supreme Court’s numerous preemption cases follow
no predictable jurisprudential or analytical pattern.”).
169. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Kevin S. Schwartz, Chevron and Agency Norm-Entrepreneurship, 115 YALE L.J. 2623, 2627–30 (2006) (arguing that canons are a weak constraint
because of their changing nature and the uncertainty of their application); see also John F.
Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 228
(arguing that judicial manipulation of canons upsets congressional choice to legislate in
broad terms and gives the Court, rather than Congress, the ultimate responsibility for defining legislative policy).
170. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983) (“The practical effect of interpreting statutes to avoid
raising constitutional questions is therefore to enlarge the already vast reach of constitutional prohibition beyond even the most extravagant modern interpretation of the
Constitution.”).
171. See Manning, supra note 67, at 2471 (arguing that “[i]n contrast with the rather
more precise background conventions . . . the absurdity doctrine is too broad and unintelligible to give either legislators or the public a realistic basis on which to evaluate the
specific outcomes reached through the legislative process”).
172. See Slocum, supra note 19, at 381–83 (arguing that some clear statement canons can
add predictability to the law).
173. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 29 (1983) (explaining that the “rule [of
lenity] ‘comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has
expressed’” (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961))); see also supra
note 130 (explaining the difference between clear statement rules and tie-breaker canons).
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Other Interpretive Tools and Congressional Intent

Substantive canons can thus be framed as setting forth conventions, on the basis of broad generalizations about congressional intent
and the interpretation of legal language, but the legitimacy of these
conventions can be challenged based on their accuracy.174 The proposition that the conventions underlying substantive canons have
been viewed by some as inaccurate does not, however, distinguish
them from other interpretive tools. Despite the absence of any kind
of objective standard for determining the probabilistic force of interpretive tools, most tools have been criticized for being inaccurate
gauges of congressional intent.
1. Legislative History and Dictionaries
Consider several popular interpretive tools. Legislative history,
for example, if considered at any early stage of the interpretive process, may, in contrast to substantive canons, help agencies because it
may contribute to a finding of ambiguity.175 Legislative history has
long been a tool that courts have used (including the Court in Chevron) to search for indications of congressional intent.176 Although the
judiciary’s use of legislative history has declined, it is still frequently
consulted by courts.177 Some scholars have argued, however, that judicial consideration of legislative history is, at best, not probative, and,
at worst, has a negative probative value.178 Additionally, a common
criticism of legislative history is its particular amenability to ideologi174. See supra Part III.A–C.
175. See Bell, supra note 108, at 132 (“[B]ecause legislative history is voluminous and
conflicting, a court might more likely conclude that most statutes are unambiguous if it
uses a theory that disregards legislative history.”).
176. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
851–53 (1984) (providing an extensive discussion of legislative history). The Court’s decision in Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), is generally recognized as
the first case to sanction the use of legislative history. See Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1835
(noting that “Holy Trinity elevated legislative history to new prominence by overturning the
traditional rule that barred judicial recourse to internal legislative history”).
177. See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative
History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220
(2006) (examining the decline in the use of legislative history); see also Cross, supra note
91, at 1980–83 (showing empirically that legislative history “remains a significant source for
statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court”).
178. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913,
1924–25 (2006) (listing the arguments against the use of legislative history, including the
fact that the purpose of a multi-member body cannot readily be discerned, such purposes
are often mixed or muddled, and the statements of committees or individual members do
not stand for the whole); Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1838 (questioning the judiciary’s
competence to draw intentionalist inferences from legislative history).
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cally motivated misuse.179 Thus, the use of legislative history has been
criticized for being both inherently unreliable and susceptible to ideological manipulation.
In Chevron cases, some courts have agreed that legislative history
should not be considered. The Second Circuit, for example, is reluctant to consider legislative history at Step One because the “‘interpretive clues’ to be found in such history will rarely speak with sufficient
clarity to permit us to conclude ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”180 Similarly, the Third Circuit has indicated that legislative history should not
be considered at Step One.181 In essence, these courts, as well as some
scholars, believe that the consideration of legislative history does not
reliably increase the probability of accurate interpretations when Chevron is applicable.182
The criticism of legislative history may reflect the broader trend
of greater judicial reliance on text-centric modes of interpretation,
but such interpretive tools have similarly been criticized.183 Consider
the use of dictionaries to define statutory terms, which has greatly increased over the last couple of decades.184 Similar to claims that other
tools of interpretation are selectively employed, judges have been accused of using dictionaries to support result-oriented interpretations
by searching various dictionaries until a desired interpretation is lo179. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (explaining that “legislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory” and subject
to manipulation by “unelected staffers and lobbyists”). But see James J. Brudney & Corey
Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect,
29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 146–51 (2008) (arguing that legislative history has often
been used in a principled manner by the Supreme Court).
180. Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted).
181. See United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 292–94 (3d Cir. 2008) (indicating that
legislative history should not be considered in Step One, but noting past confusion about
the issue).
182. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 192–93 (2006) (arguing that judicial use of legislative history cannot be expected to improve the decisional process because the possibility of
benefits is effectively counterbalanced by the possibility of harms, although legislative history can be expected to increase the costs of the process itself).
183. See Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1909, 1935 (2005) (indicating that “some scholars have alleged a growing disenchantment”
with textualism).
184. See Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress:
The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 251–60 (1999)
(documenting the increased use of dictionaries by the Court); see also Note, Looking It Up:
Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438 (1994) [hereinafter
Looking It Up] (“Over the past decade, the Supreme Court’s use of dictionaries in its published opinions has increased dramatically.”).
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cated.185 In addition, courts, perhaps unwittingly, often commit temporal errors by relying on dictionaries from a time period different
than the relevant statutory text, even though the meaning of words
often changes over time.186 Even ingenuous uses of dictionaries are
seen by some as problematic due to the “fundamental indeterminacy”
of dictionary meanings and the flawed relationship that dictionary
meanings bear to the context and meaning of statutory terms.187
2. Textual Canons and Conventions About Language
Similar to dictionaries, textual canons are popular interpretive
tools that are considered to be traditional tools of statutory construction.188 Unlike substantive canons, which typically narrow statutory
meaning and thereby reduce the range of allowable agency discretion,
textual canons can make a broader interpretation more plausible.189
Textual canons “set forth inferences that are usually drawn from the
drafter’s choice of words, their grammatical placement in sentences,
and their relationship to other parts of the statute.”190 The key assumption underlying these canons is that when Congress enacts statutory language, it does so according to accepted precepts of grammar
and logic.191 Courts assume, for example, that Congress does not include superfluous statutory language,192 that when it enumerates
things it does not intend to include things not listed,193 and that it
185. See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 297–331 (1998) (suggesting that the level of linguistic analysis performed by courts rarely rises above “definition shopping”).
186. See Looking It Up, supra note 184, at 1447 (“The meanings of words change over
time, and major dictionaries are updated at sufficiently infrequent intervals to allow significant linguistic development between editions.” (footnote call numbers omitted)).
187. Id. at 1445.
188. See Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 23 (2006) (“[Interpretive]
canons are tools designed to help courts better determine what Congress intended, not to
lead courts to interpret the law contrary to that intent.”); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You
Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563
(1992) (“A judge deploying a [textual] canon is attempting to act as an agent to effectuate
congressional intent.”).
189. The rule against surplusage, for example, can broaden the reach of a provision by
forcing a court to give all of the terms in the provision a separate meaning. See infra note
192 and accompanying text (describing the rule against surplusage).
190. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 17, at 848.
191. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 130, at 341 (asserting that textual canons have “longstanding pedigrees and reflect linguistic and syntactic understandings that may be useful in
context”).
192. See, e.g., Lindsey Coal Mining Co. v. Chater, 90 F.3d 688, 692 (3d Cir. 1996) (indicating that surplusage “cannot have been Congress’s intent”).
193. See, e.g., Carlson v. Reed, 249 F.3d 876, 882 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Applying the canon
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Congress’s failure to expressly require R nonimmigrants
to maintain a foreign residence must have been deliberate.”).
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intends for similar language within the same statutory section to have
a consistent meaning.194
Courts often apply textual canons in Step One pursuant to the
view that these tools assist in determining whether Congress has directly answered a statutory question.195 Compared to substantive canons, textual canons are not controversial in Step One because they
are widely viewed as devices that courts use when attempting to estimate congressional intent, rather than when attempting to promote
the court’s own vision of desirable policy.196 Some scholars who criticize the use of substantive canons in Step One find textual canons less
objectionable, if not appropriate.197
Because both types of canons are based on conventions about
language, textual canons are quite similar to substantive canons, despite the distinction typically made between the two types by scholars.198 It is true that textual canons focus on the language of the
statute itself, through grammatical and similar rules, while substantive
canons relate to how exogenous issues interact with the statutory language.199 Both groups of canons, however, set forth presumptions
about how Congress chooses statutory language.200 Thus, a substantive canon, such as the presumption against retroactivity, assumes that
Congress includes specific and explicit language when it intends for
statutory language to have retroactive effects, while a textual canon,
such as the rule against surplusage, assumes that Congress intends for
194. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Magone, 53 F. 1008, 1010 (2d Cir. 1893) (indicating that the
“principle of noscitur a sociis[ ] show[s] the intent of congress”).
195. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 675
(2000) (“[T]he Court regularly applies text-oriented canons in determining whether Congress has spoken to an issue under Step One of Chevron.”); Mendelson, supra note 20, at
745 (“Despite Chevron . . . courts generally have applied rules of syntax in preference to
agency interpretations on the ground that the syntax rules represent traditional tools of
statutory construction by which courts can discern whether Congress has directly answered
a statutory question under Chevron Step One.”).
196. See Sunstein, supra note 41, at 2105, 2109 (stating that “Chevron is plainly overcome
by principles that help to ascertain congressional instructions,” which include “syntactic
principles” because such principles are “explicitly designed to help capture legislative
instructions”).
197. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 20, at 745 (distinguishing textual canons from substantive canons and criticizing the use of substantive canons in Step One).
198. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (demonstrating that some scholars disfavor the application of substantive canons when addressing the interpretive tools that courts
should consider in Step One).
199. See supra Part III.A (describing substantive canons); see also supra notes 188–94 and
accompanying text (describing textual canons).
200. See supra notes 111–16 and accompanying text (describing some assumptions underlying substantive canons).
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each statutory term to have meaning.201 An understanding of substantive canons as well-established conventions used to estimate congressional intent makes the exceptions to statutory language created by
them resemble the nonideological, if sometimes controversial, conventions used with regard to textual canons and less like simple normative choices made by courts.202 Indeed, it has been argued that
relying on rules of interpretation, instead of open-ended judgments
about congressional intent, helps restrain judges who might interpret
statutes according to their own policy preferences.203
Legitimizing substantive canons by virtue of their commonalities
with textual canons is only effective if one is convinced, as many are
not, that textual canons are legitimate. Although textual canons may
be free from claims that they are endogenously underscored by policy
choices, they are subject to other familiar criticisms. One important
criticism, made by various prominent scholars, is that their presumptions do not actually reflect congressional intent or practice.204 Textual canons have also been criticized on the basis that they are often,
and easily, manipulated by judges in order to reach favored interpretations.205 In addition, due to Karl Llewellyn’s classic analysis, the
conventional wisdom for some time was that canons are habitually in
conflict.206 It should not be surprising, then, that a high percentage
201. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (explaining the presumption against retroactivity); supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing the rule against surplusage).
202. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (describing the view among many scholars that substantive canons represent judicial policy choices).
203. See Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Making Laws Moral: A Defense of Substantive Canons of
Construction, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 915, 918 (“A canons-based approach to interpretation will
permit judges to bring in extrinsic legal principles to resolve hard cases without making ad
hoc decisions based on one’s policy preferences.”).
204. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 97–98 (2006) (maintaining that it cannot be argued that all of the textual canons reflect legislators’ actual knowledge of the contents of legislation); Posner, supra note 170, at
806 (arguing against the use of interpretative canons in part because they do not reflect
the way in which legislatures behave); see also Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 863, 873–74 (1930) (“The rule that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another is in direct contradiction to the habits of speech of most persons.”).
205. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (2005) (indicating that a study of the Supreme
Court’s workplace decisions revealed that generally “liberals and conservatives seem to
have relied on both language and substantive canons as support for their pre-existing ideological preferences”). In addition, textual canons also have a non-empirically based reputation for being manipulable. See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 69, at 2148 (“[C]hoosing
interpretive canons is like entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of
the guests for one’s friends.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
206. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950) (providing
Llewellyn’s analysis of canons of construction); see also DICKERSON, supra note 35, at 227
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of references to textual canons by Supreme Court Justices have been
negative in nature.207 Some lower courts have also expressed hesitation about applying textual canons in Step One.208
IV.

SUBSTANTIVE CANONS SHOULD BE APPLIED
SIMILARLY TO NON-CHEVRON CASES

IN

CHEVRON CASES

Even if one is convinced that the creation of substantive canons is
typically motivated by policy concerns, such a conclusion is not automatically delegitimizing, even when Chevron is applicable. A defensible normative view of the judiciary is that one of its proper functions is
to exercise authority “temporarily to obstruct hasty and ill-conceived
laws” through substantive canons “so to protect minorities and ameliorate changes that trench on fundamental liberties.”209 Nevertheless,
even if it is conceded that the primary goal of statutory interpretation
is to accurately estimate congressional intent, as I assume, various aspects of the endeavor, such as the broadly worded nature of many
statutes and the indeterminate nature of language, the unproven connection between interpretive tools and congressional intent, as well as
the subjective nature of the ambiguity determination, make the process highly discretionary.210 It is thus problematic to draw distinctions—as those who would prohibit judicial consideration of
substantive canons in the Chevron context would do—between interpretive tools that guide interpreters in determining whether a statute
is ambiguous and those that guide interpreters in construing statutes
that are ambiguous.211 For similar reasons, distinctions between tools
that reflect judicial policy determinations and those that reflect estimations of congressional intent or drafting habits are also
problematic.212
(indicating that “[i]t is now fashionable to repudiate all ‘canons of interpretation’ on the
ground that they largely cancel each other out” (citation omitted)).
207. See Cross, supra note 91, at 1985 (indicating that a “proportionally high number of
references to the canons are negative ones”).
208. See, e.g., Tex. Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 694 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (declaring that the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius—“‘the expression of
one is the exclusion of others’”—“has little force in the administrative setting” because it is
too weak to support a conclusion that Congress resolved the issue).
209. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 77, at 618.
210. See supra Part II.B (describing the various reasons why legal ambiguity determinations are discretionary and subjective).
211. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the conventional view among
scholars that policy judgments underlying substantive canons make such canons inconsistent with Chevron).
212. Obviously, it is not difficult to create hypothetical interpretive tools that all would
concede are based on policy determinations rather than estimations of congressional in-
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As this Article has illustrated, all interpretive tools can be attacked
on the basis that their definitions contain inaccurate presumptions of
congressional drafting practices and that they can be manipulated by
judges in order to reach favored interpretations.213 In addition, the
application of any interpretive tool is discretionary and thus constitutes a policy choice.214 A proper understanding of the nature of statutory interpretation reveals, then, that substantive canons are not as
exceptional as some have claimed.215 Indeed, there is symmetry between the broad assumptions about congressional intent underlying
the Chevron doctrine and those underlying substantive canons.216
A. Substantive Canons Should Be Applied in Chevron Step One
The argument against the consideration of substantive canons in
Step One is based on the questionable notions that distinctions can
and should be made between policy-based interpretive tools and interpretive tools that are based on estimations of congressional intent,
that distinctions can readily be made between accurate and inaccurate
interpretive tools, and that ambiguity-determining interpretive tools
can be distinguished from tools designed to choose between ambiguous interpretations.217 The view that substantive canons should be applied in Step One when determining whether statutory language is
ambiguous may possess significant conceptual difficulties, as Part II
explained, but it reflects the Court’s view of the role of canons and
Chevron better than would alternative approaches.218 The persistent
view among scholars that Chevron fundamentally changed the hermeneutics of statutory interpretation, especially the legitimacy of substantive canons, is unsurprising considering the facile two-step doctrine
that some thought would systematize the seemingly arbitrary nature of
tent. It is more difficult, though, to prove that existing interpretive tools are based on
policy, rather than estimations of congressional intent.
213. See supra Part III.C (discussing the perceived inaccuracies of substantive canons).
214. See supra Part II.B (explaining the various aspects of the ambiguity determination
that are subjective and discretionary).
215. This is not to say that substantive canons are not important or that one should not
be skeptical of the judiciary’s motivations for creating these canons. See Slocum, supra note
151, at 313–16 (criticizing substantive canons that are designed to narrow interpretations
beyond what legislators would have expected).
216. See supra notes 111–18 and accompanying text (explaining that both substantive
canons and the Chevron doctrine are based on judicial claims of congressional intent).
217. See supra Parts II–III.
218. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (describing the conventional view held
by scholars that substantive canons are inconsistent with the Chevron doctrine).
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the former deference regime.219 There is little evidence, however,
that Chevron was intended to be a defining case that would require
dramatic changes to the judicial selection and application of interpretive tools.
Supporting the argument that Chevron was not intended to fundamentally alter the continuing legitimacy of substantive canons, or
other interpretive tools, is the absence of any indication from the
Court of such an intent. Indeed, it has been pointed out that the
personal papers of the Justices indicate that it does not appear that
any of them considered the case to be anything other than routine.220
In its opinion, the Court indicated only that “traditional tools of statutory construction” should be applied in Step One.221 Considering
that many canons of statutory construction predate the Chevron decision, the Court would likely have at least hinted at the transformational nature of a decision that would preclude courts from
considering substantive canons in Step One. Instead, at most, the
Court indicated that reviewing courts should not rely on generalized
purposive reasoning, unconnected to actual congressional intent, in
order to decide a case at Step One.222 In addition, in a later case,
United States v. Mead Corp.,223 the Court indicated that the Chevron decision stood for the proposition that an agency’s compliance with
more formal procedures provided an “additional reason for judicial
deference” to an agency’s interpretation,224 which suggests that Chevron’s change to the doctrines relating to deference to agency interpretations was meant, at most, to be modest rather than significant.225
219. See infra note 289 and accompanying text (explaining that some observers believed
Chevron would bring greater consistency to judicial review of agency interpretations).
220. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1253, 1257 (1997) (“A scholar who has examined the file on Chevron in the papers of
the late Justice Thurgood Marshall at the National Archives reports that it contains no
evidence that any Justice saw the case as anything other than a routine environmental
opinion.” (citing Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from
the Marshall Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,606, 10,613 (1993))).
221. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984).
222. See id. at 845 (finding that “the Court of Appeals misconceived the nature of its
role” and explaining that the court should have confined itself to search for specific congressional intent regarding the particular program at issue).
223. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
224. Id. at 229.
225. In a previous article, I suggested that the Chevron decision transformed statutory
interpretation methodology. See Brian G. Slocum, Overlooked Temporal Issues in Statutory
Interpretation, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 635, 675–77 (2008) (noting that “Chevron significantly modified the existing rules of judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations”). The
Court claimed in Chevron, though, that it was merely restating “well-settled principles.” 467
U.S. at 845. Regardless of whether this assertion was disingenuous, or later proved to be an
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Beyond the absence of any indication in Chevron that substantive
canons are incompatible with the Chevron doctrine, the nonconsideration of substantive canons when Chevron is implicated would cause
fundamental, and doctrinally troublesome, changes to statutory interpretation, both in and out of the administrative state.226 A conclusion
that substantive canons are generally legitimate yet inconsistent with
Chevron because they are based on policy considerations, rather than
congressional intent, would likely be seen by the Court as delegitimizing its interpretive rules. The Court has a dual role in matters of statutory interpretation as both the self-proclaimed “faithful agent[ ]” of
Congress and the creator of the rules of interpretation.227 The Court
would undoubtedly resist a categorization of substantive canons that
would create disharmony between these dual roles.228
Declaring substantive canons to be incompatible with Chevron
would also be problematic because it would create a significant discrepancy between the cases where Chevron is not applicable and the
canons are applied and the cases where Chevron is applicable and the
canons are not applied. Considering that William Eskridge’s recent
empirical study of Chevron demonstrated that the doctrine is frequently ignored by the Court,229 a rigid distinction between Chevron
applicable and non-Chevron cases for purposes of substantive canon
application would draw an arbitrary bright line, in addition to the already present ambiguity bright line, that may not be particularly effective as a means of preserving agency discretion. Another reason also
indicates that such a policy would not necessarily ensure that substantive canons would not interfere with agency policymaking. After the
Court’s decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand
X Internet Services, a reviewing court must defer to a reasonable agency
interpretation even when a previous court has adopted an alternative
interpretation, so long as the previous court held that the provision at
understatement, it is consistent with the recent trend of the Court to frame its decisions as
non-transformative.
226. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining the widely shared view
among scholars that the policy judgments that undergird substantive canons are inconsistent with Chevron).
227. See Manning, supra note 70, at 419 (explaining that courts purport to act as the
“faithful agents” of Congress); Slocum, supra note 225, at 639 (explaining that courts have
primary responsibility for creating interpretive rules).
228. Cf. Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1478–79 (2007) (explaining
that courts often create legal fictions in order to avoid delegitimizing consequences).
229. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 145, at 1090 (noting that the “most striking finding”
of their study was that “in the majority of cases—53.6% of them—the Court [did] not
apply any deference regime at all”).
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issue was ambiguous.230 In a case where Chevron is not applicable and
the court resolves the case through the application of a canon without
a formal finding that the statute is ambiguous, it is not clear that the
agency, pursuant to the Court’s decision in Brand X, can subsequently
change the court’s interpretation.231
Certainly, it is difficult to maintain, as substantive canons assume,
that the Court has accurately identified the areas where Congress is
more explicit when drafting legislation, and the Court’s generalized,
and perhaps erroneous, assumptions about congressional intent may
sometimes preclude deferring to agency policy views.232 Yet such observations do not require a conclusion that substantive canons are incompatible with Chevron. If, as it has been argued, agencies are more
politically accountable than courts, more knowledgeable regarding
the statutes that they administer, and more capable of making sound
policy choices, it is not clear why courts should not defer to all agency
interpretations.233 Instead, the issue is one of language and the judiciary’s constitutional duty to interpret legislative commands. Although
legal realist understandings of the inherently subjective and discretionary nature of interpretation should convince courts to exercise
more restraint in their creation and modification of substantive canons and perhaps to reduce the strength of some of the canons that
overdetermine statutory meaning, the legitimacy of substantive canons must be separated from their compatibility with Chevron.234 If
the consideration of substantive canons were to be prohibited in Step
One, it should be part of a general first-order reconsideration of interpretive tools rather than through the selective labeling of substantive
canons as being inconsistent with Chevron.235

230. 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005).
231. Even if an agency can subsequently change the court’s interpretation, courts might
be more likely to declare that the statutory provision at issue is unambiguous and to interpret the statute in accordance with what the unapplied substantive canon would have dictated. See infra Part V.B (discussing the Brand X decision and its consequences).
232. See supra notes 111–16 and accompanying text (describing the assumptions underlying substantive canons).
233. One response might be that agencies are better at identifying current legislative
preferences, but are not likely to be as skilled at identifying past legislative preferences as
courts are; however, even this assertion is far from self-evident.
234. Cf. Slocum, supra note 151, at 317–18 (arguing for more judicial restraint in the
creation and modification of substantive canons).
235. See VERMEULE, supra note 182, at 147 (distinguishing between first-order and second-order arguments in statutory interpretation).
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Substantive Canons Should Not Be Applied in Chevron Step Two

An alternative approach, argued recently by Kenneth Bamberger,
is that substantive canons only should be considered in Step Two
when the court evaluates the reasonableness of the agency’s chosen
interpretation.236 Such an approach purports to reconcile the proposition that judicial review should not be policy-free with the proposition that agencies should have primary responsibility for policy
application.237 A decision that substantive canons should be considered in Step Two as part of an agency-dominated balancing of values
process, instead of in Step One as devices used to estimate congressional intent, would, however, fit awkwardly within the existing Chevron framework. The Court does not currently review whether canons
are considered by agencies.238 More importantly, such an approach
would serve to delegitimize substantive canons. If substantive canons
can be classified as unverified, and sometimes false, when viewed as
being based on estimations of congressional intent, they seem illegitimate if explicitly viewed as solely judicial policy choices imposed on
agencies and Congress.239
Apart from the low probability of judicial adoption, the normative benefits of considering substantive canons in Step Two are unclear. Bamberger claims that the consideration of substantive canons
in Step Two will uniquely encourage agencies to internalize the norms
promoted by such canons.240 It is unlikely, though, that the consideration of substantive canons in Step Two, which is often not reached by
reviewing courts, could surpass the incentives created by Step One application. Under Step One consideration of substantive canons, if the
agency ignores an applicable canon, it risks being reversed by a reviewing court that is willing to apply the canon.241 For example, if an
agency considers adopting an interpretation of a statute that would
have retroactive effects on individuals, it should anticipate that, unless
the statute contains clear language sanctioning such an interpreta236. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64 (2008) (providing Bamberger’s recent argument).
237. Id. at 117–21.
238. See Bell, supra note 108, at 124 (explaining that courts typically “review only the
agency’s ultimate decisions, not the grounds on which they are based”).
239. Even if some see the Court’s proper role as being explicitly policy-based in nature,
the Court views its primary function as being the faithful agent of Congress in matters of
statutory interpretation. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
240. See Bamberger, supra note 236, at 64 (arguing that his Step Two proposal “creates
incentives for robust agency norm protection in the first instance”).
241. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 377, 380–82 (2005) (applying the canon of
constitutional avoidance to strike down an agency regulation that gave the agency the
power to detain a particular class of immigrants indefinitely).
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tion, a reviewing court will likely apply the presumption against retroactivity and invalidate the agency’s interpretation without ever
reaching Step Two.242
In addition, many would likely disagree with Chevron reforms that
could potentially increase the already high rate of deference given to
agency interpretations. It is logical to conclude that the consideration
of fewer interpretive tools in Step One will lead to an increased number of cases that reach Step Two and hence greater deference to
agency interpretations because “[m]ore than 90 percent of invalidations under Chevron occur[ ] under Step One.”243 The impact of considering substantive canons in Step Two, though, is unknown because
the addition of a new balancing process in Step Two may lead to unpredictable changes in the degree of deference given to agency
interpretations.
More importantly, advocating the consideration of substantive canons in Step Two necessarily conflates the requirements for application of the canon (which occurs in all cases—even those outside of
the Chevron context) with a novel Step Two balancing process of
whether the canon should be applied.244 For many canons where relevant agency expertise is likely lacking, such as the canon requiring a
clear congressional statement to repeal habeas corpus jurisdiction, it
is not clear what benefits would accrue from judicial deference to an
agency’s balancing of the canon’s norms and other considerations, or
what the other considerations may be.245 In addition, there is no reason why, in Step One, courts cannot adequately account for agency
arguments, especially ones based on agency expertise, about whether
the conditions for triggering the canon have been met.246

242. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (describing the presumption against
retroactivity).
243. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 838 n.26.
244. See Bamberger, supra note 236, at 111–14 (advocating a balancing approach to the
application of substantive canons).
245. See Slocum, supra note 19, at 372–76, 401 (describing the habeas corpus clear statement rule). Bamberger recognizes that agency expertise will not be relevant to the application of some substantive canons. See Bamberger, supra note 236, at 101 (explaining that
“some underlying doctrines may prescribe inquiries amenable to agency competence,
while others may not”). For these canons, Step Two application would make little sense, as
would the application of some strong substantive canons in Step One and other equally
strong substantive canons in Step Two.
246. See infra Part V.A (arguing that courts should consider agency views when determining the meaning of statutory language).
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CHEVRON

This Article has argued against the popular notion that Chevron,
in both a positive and normative sense, should be viewed as a transformative case in the way in which courts apply interpretive tools when
reviewing agency interpretations.247 Thus, substantive canons should
be applied equally in Chevron and non-Chevron cases.248 The Chevron
doctrine did have a transformative, but generally unacknowledged,
impact on judicial review of agency interpretations, though, by granting significant doctrinal importance to the explicit ambiguity analysis
as the determiner of whether an agency’s interpretation will receive
deference. Regardless of the agency’s expertise or the circumstances
of the case, a reviewing court under Chevron purports to independently determine the meaning of the relevant statute unless and until
it determines that the statute is ambiguous.249 Chevron’s transformation shifted judicial review from a process that considered agency deliberation and expertise, among other factors, to an initial and
primary focus on ambiguity.250
Prior to Chevron, courts applied the standard from Skidmore v.
Swift & Co.,251 which provided a sliding scale of deference depending
on the circumstances, such as whether the agency interpretations
were longstanding, consistent, well reasoned, thorough, based on expertise, and the result of participatory and adequate procedures.252
The Court made clear that agency interpretations would have only
persuasive authority, and hence that the statutory question would be
resolved judicially rather than administratively.253 In contrast, Chevron
has been seen as a triumph of legal realism because it recognizes that
the resolution of statutory uncertainties involves policy choices that
247. See supra notes 220–25 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons why Chevron
was not seen by the Court as an important case).
248. See supra Part IV.A (arguing that there is no reason to distinguish between Chevron
and non-Chevron applications).
249. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text (describing the two-step Chevron
doctrine).
250. See Merrill, supra note 84, at 977 (“Chevron transformed a regime that allowed
courts to give agencies deference along a sliding scale into a regime with an on/off
switch.”); Molot, supra note 28, at 51 (discussing Chevron’s transformation of “judicial decisionmaking from a choice along a spectrum to a single ‘all-or-nothing’ dichotomy”).
251. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
252. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1258–59 (2007) (discussing the Skidmore factors); Glen
Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1306 n.196 (2009) (listing the Skidmore factors).
253. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (explaining that deference is calibrated to the agency
interpretation’s “power to persuade”).
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are more suited for agency, rather than judicial, resolution.254 Ultimately, though, the ambiguity-elevating aspect of Chevron places unnecessary emphasis on a purely subjective and discretionary standard
and is incongruent with the realities of statutory interpretation.255
A. The Superfluity of Chevron
A recent scholarly debate about Chevron illustrates the disutility of
the traditional ambiguity determination. Matthew Stephenson and
Adrian Vermeule argue that Chevron should be seen as requiring
courts to address the single inquiry of the “reasonableness of the
agency’s statutory interpretation.”256 In their view, courts must first
decide whether the agency’s interpretation falls within the court-constructed “zone of ambiguity.”257 The other applicable review is the
non-Chevron review of whether the agency’s explanation for its interpretation satisfies the arbitrary and capricious standard.258 In contrast, Kenneth Bamberger and Peter Strauss agree with the “zone of
ambiguity” view, but highlight the importance of the Step One ambiguity determination.259 In their view, deemphasizing the central ambiguity determination of Chevron, as Stephenson and Vermeule’s
version does, would distract courts from the “essential judicial function” of “bounding agency authority.”260
Framing Step One as requiring courts to determine a statute’s
“zone of ambiguity” is an improvement on the traditional approach.
Recall that the traditional ambiguity determination operates as an
on/off switch: A court declares a statutory provision to be either ambiguous or clear.261 Under a zone of ambiguity understanding,
though, the reviewing court determines the “set of interpretations
which the statute does not clearly prohibit.”262 The zone of ambiguity
254. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980
(2005) (“Filling these gaps [in ambiguous statutes] involves difficult policy choices that
agencies are better equipped to make than courts.”).
255. See supra Part II.B.4 (explaining the difficulties involved with determining whether
interpretive rules reflect congressional intent).
256. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L.
REV. 597, 598 (2009).
257. See id. (arguing that courts should “jettison the two-step framework and acknowledge that Chevron calls for a single inquiry into the reasonableness of the agency’s statutory
interpretation”).
258. See id. at 604 (distinguishing between Chevron and “arbitrary and capricious
review”).
259. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611,
611 (2009).
260. Id. at 612.
261. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
262. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 256, at 601.
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approach thus softens the rigid traditional ambiguity on/off determination. It thereby reflects the essential understanding that interpretation is an uncertain and discretionary process that involves applying
nonempirically tested interpretive rules to estimate congressional intent.263 As Stephenson and Vermeule point out, one major disadvantage of the traditional ambiguity determination is that if a judge
spends an “inordinate amount of time trying to figure out the best
construction of the statute,” which the traditional approach encourages, “it may be difficult for [her] to shift mental gears to decide
whether an agency interpretation that differs from the judge’s sense
of the best interpretation is nonetheless reasonable.”264
While it is an improvement on the current way in which courts
determine ambiguity, the zone of ambiguity conceptualization is
nonetheless insufficiently reformatory. The zone of ambiguity approach might soften the all-or-nothing approach of the traditional
ambiguity determination, but it still nevertheless can only be described as a softened all-or-nothing approach.265 Thus, the two approaches described above may differ on various details regarding the
administration of Chevron but still incorporate, although with different
degrees of emphasis, an explicit ambiguity determination as part of
their judicial review paradigms. In that respect, neither proposal is
willing to abandon altogether Chevron or its explicit ambiguity
determination.
Although Stephenson and Vermeule may seem close to disavowing the centrality of Chevron’s ambiguity determination, their proposal
maintains its relevance in related ways. One fundamental flaw in Stephenson and Vermeule’s approach is that it maintains the distinction
between Chevron and Skidmore by continuing to grant paradigmatic
doctrinal significance to whether the agency’s interpretation was contained in sufficiently formal procedures.266 Until recently, one of the
notable aspects of Chevron was its across-the-board presumption that in
cases of statutory ambiguity courts should defer to agency interpretations.267 In United States v. Mead Corp.,268 the Court held that Congress
263. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (explaining that courts do not subject
interpretive tools to empirical validation).
264. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 256, at 605 (emphasis omitted).
265. Cf. supra note 250 (describing Chevron as creating an all-or-nothing approach).
266. See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 256, at 598 & n.4 (advocating that courts
should view “Chevron [as] call[ing] for a single inquiry,” while maintaining the distinction
between Chevron and Skidmore).
267. See Scalia, supra note 85, at 516 (“Chevron . . . replaced this statute-by-statute evaluation . . . with an across-the-board presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant.”).
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intends for Chevron deference to be granted to agency interpretations
only under certain circumstances.269 The Court stated that Chevron
deference should apply only when “it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”270 Thus, Chevron does
not apply to a broad array of administrative interpretations that lack
the force of law and result from relatively informal procedures.271 Instead, Skidmore is applicable.272
Substituting the zone of ambiguity approach for the traditional
ambiguity determination yet maintaining the Chevron/Skidmore distinction would exaggerate any remaining difference between the two doctrines. The reconceptualization of Chevron’s explicit ambiguity
determination as a zone of ambiguity renders it difficult, in both a
positive and normative sense, to ascribe any remaining distinctiveness
to Chevron when compared to Skidmore’s sliding scale approach. This
is especially true if a reviewing court chooses to consider the agency’s
interpretation as one of the “traditional tools of statutory interpretation” under Chevron Step One and believes that the range of ambiguity should depend on the context, including the agency’s expertise.273
The only remaining distinction is an unspecified, but supposedly
greater, degree of deference due the agency’s interpretation under
Chevron because of the procedural format pursuant to which the
268. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
269. Id. at 226–27. The question in Mead was whether Chevron applied to a tariff classification ruling of the U.S. Customs Service. Id. at 221. The Court held that Chevron did not
apply to the tariff ruling. Id. The Mead decision followed the Court’s earlier decision in
Christensen v. Harris County, in which the Court held that Chevron did not apply to an agency
interpretation contained in an opinion letter written by an agency official and later endorsed in an amicus curiae brief filed with the Supreme Court. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
The Court held that Chevron is applicable to agency interpretations only if they have been
made in a manner that has the “force of law.” Id.
270. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.
271. See id. at 229 (indicating that reviewing courts must consider all circumstances surrounding the statutory scheme and agency action to ascertain whether “Congress would
expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law” on the matter at hand).
272. See id. at 234–35 (recognizing that if Chevron is not applicable, Skidmore’s deference
to an agency’s interpretation of the law might be); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn
Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV.
467, 479 (2002) (explaining the conditions under which the Skidmore standard applies).
273. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 259, at 616 n.23 (“[T]he agency’s interpretation may itself constitute one of the ‘traditional tools of statutory interpretation.’” (citation
omitted)); Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or “The Deciders”—The Courts in Administrative Law, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 818 (2008) (“As part of its step one determination, a court might well
turn to a responsible agency’s judgment about the matter as one weight to be considered
on the scales the court is using.”).
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agency’s interpretation was produced.274 Any difference in the degree of deference, though, can be accounted for through Justice Souter’s remark in Mead that an agency following formal procedures
presented an additional reason for deference.275 Thus, the formality
of the agency’s procedures can be given appropriate weight under a
sliding scale approach to deference, such as Skidmore.276
Considering the subjective nature of ambiguity determinations
and the absence of a need for two distinct deference doctrines, the
Chevron two-step doctrine should be abandoned in favor of the Skidmore sliding scale approach. Even though the zone of ambiguity formulation is an improvement on the traditional approach to
ambiguity, it still conflates the identification of ambiguity with its resolution.277 There is no sufficient reason to insert the discretionary and
subjective explicit ambiguity test into the review process.278 As Cass
Sunstein remarked when questioning the necessity of the Mead doctrine, the Court should not privilege doctrinal complexity over simplicity when there is little to gain from maintaining multiple
standards.279 Indeed, in practice, courts do not announce a statute’s
range of ambiguity, indicating that such a practice would be foreign
and would not likely be adopted by a majority of the judiciary.280 Furthermore, empirical studies have indicated a lack of judicial commitment to the Chevron doctrine and its explicit ambiguity determination.
In a significant percentage of cases, courts do not distinguish between
274. The difference between Chevron and Skidmore has been referred to as the distinction between oversight and independent judgment. See Strauss, supra note 273, at 817
(“Chevron’s notorious two-step analysis is perhaps best understood as separating those elements of the judicial relationship to agency action that are appropriate for independent
judicial judgment from those for which the judicial role is constrained to oversight.”). The
empirical evidence indicates, however, that such a bright line doctrinal distinction has not
resulted in significant differences in the deference given to agency interpretations. See
infra note 292.
275. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 (“[T]he overwhelming number of cases applying Chevron
deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication [of the agency].”); see also supra notes 224–25 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 252 and accompanying text (citing sources that list the relevant Skidmore factors).
277. See supra Part II.B (explaining how the traditional approach to ambiguity conflates
the identification of ambiguity with its resolution).
278. See supra Part II (explaining the subjective nature of ambiguity determinations).
279. Sunstein, supra note 119, at 228.
280. A search of Westlaw reveals no mention of a “range of ambiguity” with regard to
statutory interpretation. The likelihood that widespread adoption of the range of ambiguity will not occur counsels against its adoption. See VERMEULE, supra note 182, at 123–24
(arguing that problems of judicial coordination in matters of statutory interpretation
methodology should weigh against recommendations that are unlikely to be universally
adopted).
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Step One and Step Two, but rather conflate the two steps.281 In addition, while perhaps not as directly condemnatory of the explicit ambiguity determination, William Eskridge has shown that in a majority of
Supreme Court cases, the Court inexplicably does not apply any deference standard at all.282
Instead of the artificial distinction between the consideration of
agency views regarding the meaning of a statute and the consideration
of agency views regarding the resolution of statutory ambiguity, Chevron’s two-step doctrine should be collapsed into the functionalist Skidmore review, which considers the agency’s interpretation without a
prior ambiguity determination.283 The judiciary would maintain its
role as the final authority on the interpretive scope of statutory meaning, while at the same time being obligated to consider agency views at
an earlier stage in the process.284 The more confident the court is
about its estimation of congressional intent through the application of
interpretive tools, the more powerful the other relevant factors—such
as agency expertise and procedural formality—must be in order to
prevail.285 In a sense, it would coalesce at some point with the absurdity doctrine: If one interpretation is far superior to any other, the
agency’s explanation for an alternative interpretation would need to
satisfy the absurdity doctrine’s requirement that the favored interpretation is clearly contrary to congressional intent.286 Along with its
other advantages, such a deference standard would help satiate those
critics of Chevron who have maintained that the decision is inconsis-

281. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30 (1998) (examining over 200 U.S.
Courts of Appeals cases applying Chevron and finding that in twenty-eight percent of them,
the inquiry was collapsed into the single question of whether the interpretation was
reasonable).
282. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 145, at 1090 (indicating that in 53.6% of the cases
“the Court does not apply any deference regime at all,” but rather “relies on ad hoc judicial
reasoning of the sort that typifies the Court’s methodology in regular statutory interpretation cases”).
283. See supra notes 251–53 and accompanying text (describing the operation of
Skidmore).
284. Cf. supra text accompanying note 260 (expressing the view that the ambiguity determination is vital in order to bound agency authority).
285. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528,
547–48 (2006) (arguing that the interpretive latitude given to an agency may depend on
various factors, such as the court’s confidence in the agency’s expertise, its sympathy for
the agency’s policy goals, or its assessment of the importance of the interpretive issue).
286. See Manning, supra note 67, at 2393–94 (explaining the role of the absurdity
doctrine).
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tent with the Marbury v. Madison287 principle that it is the judiciary’s
prerogative to declare the meaning of the law.288
It is not evident that there would be any significant disadvantages
to eliminating the distinction between Chevron and Skidmore because it
is not at all clear that the Chevron doctrine has produced the advantages that many have claimed. It has been argued that two of the major advantages of Chevron, as compared to Skidmore, are that Chevron
introduced simplicity to the deference rules through the two-step process and, by mandating deference to reasonable agency interpretations in cases of ambiguity, increased the uniformity of
interpretations.289 The fruition of either of these predicted benefits
has not been realized. While Skidmore’s factor-based standard is superficially more complex and nuanced, the two-step Chevron doctrine,
even twenty-five years after its introduction, is undermined by pervasive uncertainty about its basic operation. There has been, for example, no resolution of such fundamental issues as whether substantive
canons should be considered when Chevron is applicable or the nature
of review under Step Two, as well as many other issues of varying
importance.290
The uniformity advantages of the Chevron doctrine also appear to
be more theoretical than real.291 Indeed, it is not clear that Chevron
produces results much different from those that Skidmore produces.292
287. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
288. See Molot, supra note 76, at 1242–43 (discussing the concerns of Chevron’s critics
and describing the relationship between these concerns and Marbury); Jim Rossi, Respecting
Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1105, 1108 (2001) (describing Chevron “as the ‘counter-Marbury’ for the administrative
state” (citation omitted)).
289. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121
(1987) (arguing that in light of practical limits on the Supreme Court’s ability “directly to
enforce uniformity upon the courts of appeals,” the Chevron doctrine “enhances the
probability of uniform national administration of the laws”).
290. See Levin, supra note 220, at 1260–62 (discussing the confusion regarding Step
Two); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 3, at 838–52 (identifying and discussing the numerous open issues regarding the application of Chevron); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the confusion regarding whether application of Chevron precludes
application of substantive canons).
291. Moreover, it is not clear that the uniformity goal is even worth pursuing. See
Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1571, 1584–606 (2008) (arguing
against the notion that uniformity has inherent value and suggesting that courts should
avoid expending resources to standardize federal law).
292. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 145, at 1142–43 (indicating that the win rates for
Chevron and Skidmore are relatively similar, and that both are only modestly higher than the
win rate when no deference doctrine is invoked); Sunstein, supra note 119, at 229 (“Chevron and Skidmore are not radically different in practice; in most cases, either approach will
lead to the same result.”). In any case, the issue of Chevron’s explicit ambiguity determina-
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Early empirical research showed that the rate of judicial affirmations
of agency interpretations increased after the Chevron decision.293
More recent research, however, indicates that Chevron’s uniformitypromoting promise has not been as significant as predicted. Cass Sunstein’s empirical research has shown that Chevron has not had the disciplining effect that some scholars projected because judges tend to
be ideologically motivated when reviewing agency interpretations.294
Other research also indicates that the application of Chevron is driven
by the judiciary’s policy preferences.295 These findings should be anticipated, though, when one considers the centrality of Chevron’s
highly discretionary ambiguity determination.296
B. Ambiguity Determinations and Stare Decisis
Another reason for abandoning Chevron’s explicit ambiguity determination is that it has created unfortunate doctrinal difficulties in
Chevron-related areas. Traditionally, in statutory interpretation cases,
the Court accords “special force” to its precedents, unlike its decisions
interpreting the Constitution where stare decisis principles are not as
strong.297 This heightened stare decisis doctrine is such that the
Court has even expressed a reluctance to overturn decisions that no
longer may be correctly decided due to a change in an interpretive
tion is distinct from the level of deference Chevron affords agency interpretations. The
elimination of the explicit ambiguity determination, therefore, does not necessarily require a change in the degree of deference accorded to agency interpretations.
293. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1030 (finding an increase in rate of affirmed
cases from approximately seventy-one percent in the pre-Chevron year of 1984 to approximately eighty-one percent in the post-Chevron year of 1985).
294. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 823 (showing that the “most conservative
members of the Court are less likely to validate liberal agency interpretations than conservative ones, and the least conservative members of the Court show the opposite
pattern”).
295. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 109 (1994) (suggesting, based on preliminary analysis, that judicial
deference to agency decisions is driven in part by Supreme Court Justices’ policy preferences); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2168–73 (1998)
(finding that unified Republican panels were less likely to follow Chevron when the agency
decision aligned with judicial political policy preferences).
296. Even supporters of Chevron have noted that its application is subjective. See Eskridge & Schwartz, supra note 169, at 2632 (noting that Chevron “as flexibly applied by the
Court [is] workable and desirable in part because it contains play within its joints”).
297. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) (indicating that stare decisis in statutory interpretation cases has “special force” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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rule.298 The main justification for a heightened stare decisis principle
in statutory interpretation cases is based on a legislative supremacy
notion that refusing to revisit a statutory interpretation is a means of
shifting policymaking responsibility back to Congress.299 Courts have
also based the heightened stare decisis standard on the fiction of congressional acquiescence in the judicial interpretation.300 Other policies are also, of course, protected through stare decisis, including
judicial economy and reliance interests.301
After Chevron, the Court continued to grant stare decisis to its
statutory interpretations even in cases where the original decision was
a pre-Chevron interpretation of an ambiguous statute.302 The heightened stare decisis doctrine is in tension, however, with Chevron’s rationale that Congress intends to delegate to agencies the responsibility
for resolving statutory ambiguities.303 It is also in tension with the
Court’s policy that agencies may validly change their statutory interpretations as long as those changes are adequately explained.304 Unlike other rules of interpretation, Step Two functions as a dynamic

298. See id. (reasoning that “overturn[ing] a decision . . . simply because we might believe that decision is no longer ‘right’ would inevitably reflect a willingness to reconsider
others[, a]nd that willingness could itself threaten to substitute disruption, confusion, and
uncertainty for necessary legal stability”).
299. See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 317, 318 (2005) (explaining that “super-strong statutory stare decisis lets Congress
know that changes in statutory interpretations ought to come from it”); Benjamin P. Friedman, Comment, Fishkin and Precedent: Liberal Political Theory and the Normative Uses of History,
42 EMORY L.J. 647, 693 (1993) (arguing that the reason for stare decisis is to limit discretionary policymaking power of the judiciary).
300. See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 139 (noting that “Congress has long
acquiesced in the interpretation we have given”); see also Barrett, supra note 299, at 317
(explaining that “[b]y failing to amend the statute, Congress signals its acquiescence in the
Supreme Court’s approach”).
301. See generally Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of
Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1989) (explaining the justifications for heightened stare decisis in statutory interpretation cases).
302. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225,
2248–51 (1997) (describing cases in which the Court addressed the relationship between
its precedents and Chevron); see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 3, at 852 n.96 (indicating a pre-Brand X split of authority over the issue of whether federal circuit court statutory
interpretation precedents trump Chevron).
303. See supra text accompanying note 22 (explaining the principle that agencies are to
resolve statutory ambiguities through the application of policy choices).
304. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) (“We find no
basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a requirement that all
agency change be subjected to more searching review.”).
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rule because it allows the content of an act of Congress to change with
the changing policy views of the Executive Branch.305
In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Services,306 the Court addressed the tension between the rationales of
Chevron and the statutory stare decisis rule by holding that “[a] court’s
prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms
of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”307 In
the Court’s view, applying traditional stare decisis in such cases would
produce the “anomalous result[ ]” of the applicability of deference
depending on whether the reviewing court’s interpretation preceded
the agency’s interpretation.308 The Brand X decision is therefore relevant when a court has interpreted an ambiguous statutory provision
and either the agency has not promulgated an interpretation or the
interpretation is not eligible for Chevron deference.309
The combination of the traditional stare decisis rule and Brand X
has created another significant doctrinal distinction where an explicit
ambiguity finding is the determiner. If the original reviewing court
decided that the statute was unambiguous, the traditional heightened
stare decisis rule applies, but if the original reviewing court decided
that the statute was ambiguous, the agency’s subsequent interpretation may receive Chevron deference.310 It is uncertain, but may be unlikely, that an authoritative agency interpretation that is eligible for
Skidmore, but not Chevron, deference can displace a judicial interpretation that was made in the absence of an agency interpretation.311 The
fundamental problem, though, is that the Brand X rule is inconsistent
with the theory that statutory interpretation should focus on grada305. See Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1, 41 (2007)
(“Chevron’s formal rule allows agencies a great deal of room to update their interpretations
as times change.”).
306. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
307. Id. at 982; see also Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101
NW. U. L. REV. 997, 1015 (2007) (explaining that Brand X “rests on a desire to avoid the
concerns Justice Scalia raised in Mead about the ‘ossification of large portions of our statutory law’” (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting))).
308. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983.
309. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1749, 1796 (2007) (explaining the scope of Brand X).
310. See supra notes 307–09 and accompanying text.
311. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 252, at 1304–05 (indicating that the relationship between Skidmore and Chevron is open because “Skidmore is neither discussed nor even
cited in any of the opinions issued in Brand X, even though Skidmore deference shares the
same tension with stare decisis as Chevron previously did”).
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tions, which the Skidmore doctrine offers, rather than Chevron’s on/off
switches. Courts attempting to conduct the Brand X analysis will find
daunting the challenges of attempting to determine whether the earlier court asserted that its construction was the only reasonable one
and if its discussion was a holding or dicta.312
The focus of the Brand X decision on ambiguity detracts from the
principle that agencies remain in the superior position to remedy mistakes and update understandings of statutory schemes.313 Instead of
relying on a previous court’s ambiguity determination, an archeological dig that will undoubtedly prove to be frustrating, reviewing courts
should treat the Brand X understanding of the relationship between
courts and agencies as a relaxation of the traditional stare decisis standard. Similar to the Skidmore deference standard, review should operate on a sliding scale.314 Instead of searching for the previous court’s
(often absent) explicit indication of the provision’s ambiguity, the reviewing court should focus on the reasons proffered by the agency for
the interpretive change. The stronger the court’s certainty about statutory meaning, the less room there is for policy judgments, and
stronger agency arguments would be required to reverse the original
interpretation.315 Thus, in some cases, it will be clear that the agency
cannot change the original interpretation.
The following brief description outlines a stare decisis rule that
does not depend on Chevron’s explicit ambiguity determination. Regardless of the reviewing court’s views of the clarity of the relevant
statutory provision, if the agency wishes to change a previous interpretation, it must offer some new justification for its interpretation. This
is consistent with the traditional principle that stare decisis is at its
“strongest when the Court is asked to change its mind, though nothing else of significance has changed.”316 For example, perhaps the
court accepted the agency’s interpretation in the first case. If the
agency wishes to change its interpretation, it should be required to
convince the reviewing court that it has selected a reasonable interpretation and has adequately explained the reasons for the change in
312. See generally Comment, Implementing Brand X: What Counts as a Step One Holding?,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (2005) (explaining the difficulties courts will have when trying to
determine whether a previous court held a statutory provision to be ambiguous).
313. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 77, at 644 (referring to the “[c]onventional
wisdom . . . that agencies are in the best position to correct errors”).
314. See supra notes 251–53 and accompanying text (describing the Skidmore doctrine).
315. See supra notes 251–53 and accompanying text (describing the flexible nature of
Skidmore review).
316. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 144 (2008).
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policy.317 Similar to the current Chevron doctrine, the agency would
have to offer particularly persuasive reasons to change a longstanding
interpretation.318 If, in contrast, the original court chose an interpretation other than the agency’s interpretation, the agency will, in addition to establishing that its interpretation is reasonable, have to
demonstrate that some important circumstance has changed, such as
an increased level of procedural formality.319 The reviewing court
would thus still be policing the boundaries of agency action while also
maintaining a relatively vibrant stare decisis doctrine.
VI. CONCLUSION
Chevron may properly be termed an enigma due to the outstanding and important issues regarding its application, but even under a
narrow reading of the decision, the doctrine that was created has been
transformative.320 Although the changes perhaps now appear to have
been more rhetorical than actual, the Chevron decision set forth important interpretive principles that occupy a permanent place in administrative law. These principles include the important realist
observations that statutory interpretation involves policy decisions,
that agencies are better suited to make these policy decisions than are
courts, and that a reviewing court must accept a reasonable agency
interpretation of an ambiguous statute even if the interpretation is
not the one the reviewing court would have adopted.321
Despite Chevron’s important contributions to administrative law,
not all of its transformations can be deemed beneficial. The Chevron
doctrine has been described by Cass Sunstein as “a natural and proper
outgrowth of . . . the legal realist attack on the autonomy of legal
reasoning,”322 but it is time for the Chevron doctrine itself to receive a
317. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009) (explaining
that “the requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would
ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is changing position,” and that “the
agency must show that there are good reasons for the new policy” (emphasis omitted)).
318. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 145, at 1133 (indicating that “the overwhelming
majority of the cases in which the Court invokes Chevron (70.6%) involve[s] a longstanding
or fairly stable interpretation”); see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 3, at 855–56 & n.124
(explaining that under Skidmore, longstanding and consistent interpretations were granted
heavier weight than new or fluctuating interpretations).
319. See supra text accompanying note 224 (explaining the importance of the procedural circumstances in which the agency set forth its interpretation).
320. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text (describing the narrow and broad
readings of Chevron).
321. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing how Chevron requires courts to
accept second-best statutory interpretations).
322. Sunstein, supra note 43, at 2583.
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dose of legal realism. As this Article has argued, Chevron’s two-step
doctrine is in need of reformation in order to remain true to its realist
underpinnings. Most importantly, Chevron inappropriately elevates
ambiguity as the determiner of whether a court must consider the
merits of an agency’s interpretation. This determination is made
wholly subjective and discretionary by the judiciary’s conflation of ambiguity identification with ambiguity resolution, which allows courts to
determine arbitrarily the context for resolving statutory meaning.323
The two-step doctrine has also caused unnecessary confusion regarding the continuing legitimacy of various interpretive tools, particularly
substantive canons. Although many scholars have deemed substantive
canons to be policy-oriented in nature and thus incongruent with
Chevron’s rationale, substantive canons should not be excluded from
consideration on this basis because it is problematic to view Step One
as requiring a bright line distinction between interpretive tools that
reflect judicial policy determinations and those that reflect estimations of congressional intent.
Notwithstanding its valuable rhetorical admonishment to courts
to accord proper deference to agency statutory interpretations, Chevron’s doctrinal transformation should not be seen as extending to interpretive methodology. Rather, it should be limited to only a
softening of the previously strict stare decisis doctrine.324 In this way,
Chevron’s unfortunate and misleading bifurcation of statutory interpretation into ambiguity determination and ambiguity resolution can
be eliminated, and courts can return to a single-step interpretive process that considers agency views from the beginning of the process,
while at the same time still bounding the limits of agency interpretive
freedom.

323. See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining how courts conflate ambiguity identification with
ambiguity resolution).
324. See supra notes 297–301 and accompanying text (explaining the heightened stare
decisis standard that is applied to statutory interpretation cases).
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